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
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29 November 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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29 November 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC DRAFT RESOLUTION ON SPACE ARMS CIRCULATED AT UN

OW310802 Beijing XINHUA in English 0652 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] United Nations, October 30 (XINHUA) -- The text of a draft resolution submitted by China last week on space arms race prevention is being circulated here as an official document of the First Committee charged with disarmament and security issues. The draft resolution calls upon all states to "adopt prompt and effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space".

Entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space," the draft resolution calls upon all states with outer space capabilities to refrain from developing, testing or deploying outer space weapons. It particularly urges the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct serious bilateral negotiations on the matter.

China submitted a similar document to the 39th General Assembly last year. That draft was later merged with three other drafts on the same item submitted respectively by the non-aligned countries, the Western countries, and the Soviet Union. The final draft was adopted by the 39th General Assembly as resolution 39/59.

In a related development, China has submitted to the First Committee proposals on measures to promote disarmament and reduce danger of war. That document is also being circulated here as an official document of the committee under agenda item "general and complete disarmament."

The proposals contain the four suggestions enunciated by Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in his speech to the current General Assembly on September 30, namely, an unconditional pledge by all nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; an early agreement by the two military blocs on the drastic reduction of their conventional armaments; prevention of arms race in outer space; and complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

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CSO: 5200/4005

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA ON U.S. SDI REVERSAL

LD070925 Beijing XINHUA in English 0746 GMT 7 Nov 85

[Text] Washington, November 6 (XINHUA) -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan said today the United States would deploy the "star wars" defensive system unilaterally if no agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union on dismantling their respective offensive nuclear weapons once the system is developed.

This is a sharp reversal of his earlier statement made in his interview with four Soviet journalists last Thursday (?when he) said that the United States would not deploy the "star wars" system until the two superpowers scrap their nuclear missiles.

But today the President told a group of Western reporters that that was "an erroneous conclusion" and that he did not mean to give the Soviet Union veto power over the U.S. deployment of the "star wars" system. He said his concept was that "if and when we finally achieve our goal, and that is a weapon that is effective against incoming missiles...we would sit down with the other nuclear powers, our allies and our adversaries, and see if we cannot use that weapon to bring about...the elimination of nuclear weapons." If such an international conference failed to gain an agreement for mutual use of the defensive system, "we would go ahead with deployment", he added.

Reagan's comment today was an official clarification of the interpretation of his interview with the Soviet journalists. On Monday, within hours of the release of the President's interview, White House officials backed away from that interpretation, insisting that the "star wars" system would go ahead even if the Soviets refused to dismantle their nuclear missiles.

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CSO: 5200/4005

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA REPORTS ON EUREKA

Analyzes Prospects for Plan

OW021338 Beijing XINHUA in English 1052 GMT 2 Nov 85

["News Analysis Eureka: Watchword of W. Europe's High-Tech Campaign by Zhao Dahua" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, November 2 (XINHUA) -- Eighteen West European countries will convene their second ministerial conference next Tuesday and Wednesday in Hannover, Federal Germany, to discuss Europe's ambitious high-tech program dubbed "Eureka."

The name, a mere coincidence with the Greek word "Eureka" ("we have found it"), stands for the European research coordination agency, initially proposed by France in July and officially declared born by French President Francois Mitterrand at the first Eureka conference attended by 17 nations on July 17 in Paris. Today, Eureka has become a watchword for the survival of the old continent faced with a tremendous technological challenge, mainly from the United States and Japan.

The Hannover conference is expected to pass a statement of principles and to decide on the first high-tech research items needed by Eureka.

As the host of the second Eureka conference, Heinz Riesenhuber, Federal German minister of research, revealed Monday that Bonn will propose three research items on sophisticated technology -- laser, air pollution investigation and a European research network. The third item is aimed at promoting information and reference exchanges by linking computers of universities and research institutes to present communications equipment in Western Europe.

If those proposals are accepted at the conference and put into practice, Eureka will really be on the way toward the ultimate goal of building a technological Europe. Nevertheless, how the program will function has to be worked out carefully. Among other difficulties, Eureka has a financial problem and the European ministers have to decide what kind of a governing body it should have. In the beginning five years alone, an estimated 55 billion French francs (6.8 billion U.S. dollars) will have to be pooled for several major Eureka items. The program urgently needs funding from both private companies and government budgets.

Eureka will test the determination and competence of the organizers of the multilateral project. As the 1985 Nobel Prize winner for physics Klaus von Klitzing of Federal

Germany said recently, the tendency to pursue each one's own research without working with others needs rectifying.

Though there is a long way to go, the progress already made within the past half year reflects western Europe's awareness of the technological gap it has to bridge if it is to catch up with the United States and Japan.

It was the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed "star wars" program, that made Europeans feel the necessity of uniting to meet this challenge. To West Europeans, SDI, which is aimed at building an anti-missile space defense system, is also a bid to increase U.S. technological lead and reduce Europe to a more dependent position.

According to Mitterrand, Eureka is designed at establishing a technological Europe which can master all the essential technologies and make it the continent of the 21st century.

Eureka, in a sense, plays the role of matchmaker, bringing together research institutes, universities and private enterprises in Western Europe to work in concert instead of working separately.

The program is no utopia by any standards. Just think of the Euromatic, Eurobot, Eurobio and Eurotrans that are already in common use and what has been achieved by the European Space Agency (ESA), and one can see that Europeans will be capable of doing whatever the United States and Japan are doing.

Europeans stress the civil purposes of Eureka's high-technology research, hoping it will strengthen Western Europe's economy and competitiveness in the worldwide technological revolution. Equally important, Eureka will help build an independent defense system in Western Europe, thus helping alter the world's political pattern of polarization.

Never before in history have so many nations been engaged in such a great joint venture as Eureka. Should it succeed, it will certainly promote the integration of Western Europe.

Commentary on 2d Conference

OW071246 Beijing XINHUA in English 1218 GMT 7 Nov 85

["Commentary: Eureka Takes Huge Step Forward by Xia Zhimian" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, November 6 (XINHUA) -- The second Eureka ministerial conference, which ended in Hanover, Federal Germany, today, has paved the way for technological cooperation among Western European countries. The two-day conference, which approved a declaration of principles and the first 10 projects for Eureka, has achieved more concrete results compared with the first conference in Paris last July. Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher did not exaggerate when he described the atmosphere of the conference as "extremely harmonious and constructive" and said the session has made "Eureka take a huge step forward".

It only took six months for the 18 Eureka member states to formulate the declaration of principles after French President Francois Mitterrand proposed last spring that Europe should offer its industry alternatives to participating in the U.S. "star wars" space weapons research program. The progress made on Eureka has left a deep impression on the

people who compare its success with the impotence in recent years of the European Economic Community.

It is commonly known that a big technology gap exists between the Western European countries and the United States and Japan. Only by pooling dispersed manpower, machinery and technology can West Europe challenge the United States and Japan. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative has proved to be a catalyst for the promotion of technological cooperation among Western European countries.

Narrowing the technology gap with the U.S. and Japan is West Europe's new imperative. Europe's declining influence on the world economy is a result of this technological gap. The success of Eureka would restore Western Europe's decisive influence on world economy and politics.

Of course, the success of Eureka will not come easy. Plans and programs remain to be put into effect. Cooperation among 18 nations is certainly no easy job. Although the conference has reached a consensus on some main points on Eureka, major differences exist among the 18 participating countries who are split into two camps. One camp, led by France, insists that Eureka should possess financial strength to compete with the U.S. "star wars" program and to attract private enterprises and research institutions to participate in the project. French Minister for External Relations Roland Dumas made it clear that the "credibility" of Eureka is related to its financial condition. Consequently, French President Francois Mitterrand pledged one billion francs (125 million dollars) from French public funds for the program at the first ministerial conference. France also proposed setting up a permanent agency and increasing governmental involvement to ensure the success of Eureka.

Federal Germany and Britain argue to the contrary. They believe that Eureka should remain primarily a private enterprise with the least governmental interference, employing minimal public funds. They also oppose unwieldy organizational structures and suggest that Eureka should respond to the open market.

The success of the two Eureka ministerial conferences has indicated the strong desire for strengthening technological cooperation among Western European countries. But, combating interests among the participating countries are destined to make the road to Eureka a rocky one.

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CSO: 5200/4005

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NETHERLANDS 'HAWKS' WIN PARLIAMENTARY MISSILE DEBATE

PM131216 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 4 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The Hawks"]

[Text] Friday evening [1 November] made it clear that the Second Chamber parliamentary groups of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] and the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] fully and without reservations accepted the cabinet decision in favor of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles plus the decisions on other areas of Dutch military activities. The cabinet, it appears, had such difficulties with various parts of the package that it kept television viewers waiting for 4 hours, but the (slim) parliamentary majority was already there.

The 1 November decision is a Dutch contribution to the global arms race for which there is no military necessity at all and which will do nothing to promote better relations between East and West. The cabinet is choosing an enormous nuclear expansion (the rejection of some of the nuclear tasks carried out by the Netherlands Armed Forces almost pales to insignificance alongside the cruise missiles) and adds to this some conventional reinforcements! And the CDA--in which the concern over the arms race has clearly become a verbal formula which has nothing to do with the choices which the party itself makes--says "yes" and "amen."

The most surprising aspect of the 1 November decision is probably the lack of flexibility that has the appearance almost of a papal bull. It almost looks as if the government wanted to discourage the Soviet Government from making further attempts to bring about bilateral concessions. The Netherlands still does want to talk and Lubbers is not too busy to go to Moscow--seconded and watched over by Van den Broek. But any results would then be "looked at" together with our allies and with the United States in particular. The intention is clear: By using the date of 1 November like a guillotine any trade-off--something that has been sought by the cabinet itself with much pathos--has suddenly been made almost impossible.

In itself it is very easy to understand that the very late Russian invitations, which from the content viewpoint offered nothing new, did not distract the cabinet from its decisionmaking timetable. You should not enter into

negotiations having shown that you are weak at the knees. But even less should you run away prematurely from negotiations that you yourself wanted. A peculiar fixation with dates has further undermined the cabinet's credibility.

This is even more suprising given that Prime Minister Lubbers has on several occasions shown some flexibility over the possibility of alterations in the period between 1 November and parliamentary approval of an agreement with the United States. On Friday the cabinet--totally unnecessarily--reduced this possibility to a theoretical one.

Meanwhile, it has emerged that on this important point Lubbers came off worst against a majority of VVD and CDA ministers who preferred to choose the shortest route to Washington's protective wings. The prime minister--whose national standing is strong enough--can only blame this outcome on himself (and this is also true of superfluous conventional reinforcements costing hundreds of millions of guilders--will make no impression at all on the opponent of cruise missiles in Lubbers' own party. On one of the most important controversial issues in Netherlands politics the CDA has abandoned once and for all its role of reconciliation.

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CSO: 5200/2547

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PAPER ASSESSES CRUISE DEPLOYMENT ISSUE

PM151146 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Nov 85 p 9

[Editorial: "Hopes for Geneva"]

[Text] After a period of 17 months the Netherlands is, since yesterday, as far as arms control is concerned, back under the NATO umbrella. The "bilateral axis" between The Hague and Moscow which the Dutch 1 June 1984 cruise missile decision introduced has not worked--or worked sufficiently as yet--to prevent a positive deployment decision. Whether the SS-20 gestures of the last few weeks from Soviet leader Gorbachev were intended to come some way toward meeting The Hague or whether they were intended to sow confusion is an interesting, but now academic question. The Dutch reservations about the deployment of 48 cruise missiles--born in 1979 out of political confusion--have disappeared. That, in international terms, is yesterday's most important conclusion.

Prime Minister Lubbers is now completing a circle which he helped to start to draw in 1979 as Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] parliamentary group leader. To the very last he remained somewhat abivalent, as on Thursday [31 October] in the Second Chamber when this emerged from the discussion of the question of whether, at the eleventh hour, he should still pay heed to a Soviet invitation to come and talk. This despite the fact that the Soviet Union could not and would not, it seemed, come far enough toward meeting The Hague, as Lubbers said he had understood from other sources (Chancellor Kohl?).

No matter, the prime minister who spoke yesterday of an unserious invitation almost seemed different from the prime minister who stood in the Second Chamber Thursday. The long duration of the cabinet meeting probably has something to do with his irritation at the invitation. And this irritation is probably also responsible for the decision to authorize Foreign Minister Van den Broek to sign the cruise missile agreement with the United States this coming Monday [4 November].

No matter what you may think of the reservations about deployment which existed until yesterday, the repeatedly prolonged Dutch postponement stance and the Netherlands' own delayed two-track decision of June 1984, it is a fact that it is difficult to accuse The Hague of having acted too hastily.

This remained the case--the symbolism almost cannot be ignored--at the final meeting on the issue by the cabinet.

Dutch and foreign journalists had to wait for hours after the appointed time and--what is worse--their readers, viewers and listeners had to do the same. This will not have created an impression of great resoluteness in some circles. For external psychological reasons the picture of tension and delay that was maintained until the last moment did perhaps serve a purpose, hopefully one that was unintentional. If the prime minister had wanted to speed up the decisionmaking process in his cabinet through time pressure, he did not succeed very well in this.

In his letter to the cabinet presenting the 1 June decision--a letter which was not made public at the time--he justified his final proposal with, among other things, a reference to the threat to the authority of his cabinet. Surely he has not forgotten this in the last few days?

With all respect to the prime minister it should be said that if he so expressly and expertly concerns himself with the areas of responsibility of some of his colleagues, there should undoubtedly be full harmony between him and them. As far as this is concerned his harmony with the minister who bears the primary responsibility for foreign policy has actually become somewhat clearer than recent weeks have indicated was the case. Gentlemen of like mind should give this some thought. Perhaps interested People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] ministers and the defense minister would like to become party to this harmony--for the calls from this last-mentioned minister for the restoration of consensus also apply to the Catshuis [seat of Dutch Government].

Anyone who is in favor of the reduction of the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe--as we are--is left, however, with a nasty taste in his mouth by the way in which the cabinet has tackled--almost as an afterthought--the reduction in tactical nuclear weapons now being proposed to NATO. Yesterday evening CDA parliamentary group leader B. de Vries announced calmly and simply that his party and his party's parliamentary group had been wrong in their very forceful pleas for an end to the nuclear role played by Dutch howitzer artillery. He did so using arguments which, no matter what their value, could not have applied as well 6 years ago as they did yesterday.

It is not that strange that the CFA's VVD coalition partner had great difficulty--yet another reason for the delay in reaching a decision--for psychological reasons in simply meeting this new CDA realization by terminating a number of other nuclear roles fulfilled by the Netherlands. Nevertheless--also to promote the necessary greater national consensus on nuclear arms policy--it is to be hoped that the VVD will not turn its resentment on this point into a major theme in the coming election campaign. This would be asking for a fair amount of understanding on the part of our NATO partners, but they would probably be to supply this given the importance they attach to a positive deployment decision by the Netherlands.

In the field of arms control the Netherlands has now once again placed all its hopes in its partners. And above all in its biggest partner which sits at the negotiating table in Geneva. After leaving the separate Dutch-Russian line that the Netherlands itself chose last year, Prime Minister Lubbers yesterday stressed the importance of a change of direction in international trends. The positive elements contained in the 1 June 1984 decision have not borne fruit. The cabinet must base its actions within NATO on this realization, and must be judged on it. And not only for national, but above all for international reasons.

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CSO: 5200/2547

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PAPER PONDERES CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE OVER CRUISE MISSILES

PM131022 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 8 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Disobedience"]

[Text] After the 1 November decision in favor of the deployment of cruise missiles it was inevitable: a renewed discussion about civil disobedience. The reason for it is an advertisement jointly signed by the Second Chamber deputies of the Pacifist Socialist Party and the Labor Party's De Visser. The advertisement called for civil disobedience--announced in advance and non-violent--if a parliamentary majority gives its backing to deployment.

Justice Minister Korthals Altes has accused the four parliamentarians of "infringement of our democratic freedoms" and even drawn parallels with the Weimar Republic--as if political thugs will soon be parading through the streets of the Netherlands. Within the Labor Party De Visser has been criticized, while other parliamentary group members are calling for confidence in the parliamentary fight against cruise missiles.

A judgment about the principle of civil disobedience as such takes as its point of departure the inviolability of democratically taken decision. However, this inviolability is relative: Decisions can always be changed by governments, parliaments, local councils--even a decision in favor of deployment in 1988.

Civil disobedience has become part of the culture of political demonstration and action. For causes considerably less important than cruise missiles roads are blocked and other laws are broken, although seldom with any great or lasting damage. The relationship between means and ends is generally kept in mind. The text of the advertisement gives no reason to assume that things will be different in this case. Those who in this initiative see dangers for "democracy"--from the Communist Party of the Netherlands to the small right-wing parties--are frightened of ghosts.

For the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy there is an additional concern. They want to make the deployment decision irrevocable through an agreement with the United States which, for domestic political reasons, has a term of validity of 6 years. A highly improper use of international law which strangles the chances of the opponents of cruise missile deployment and by which by no means promotes confidence

in formal democracy. Such a course of action is almost an enticement to civil disobedience. If that is simply the tactic of the CDA and the VVD--as these parties themselves claim--there is no alternative for opponents.

However, there are chances of breaking this evil mechanism. If the elections of 21 May next year produce a majority opposed to deployment there is much greater practical room for maneuver in getting away from the agreement. Those calling for civil disobedience should have borne this possibility in mind.

There is little in principle with which to accuse the parliamentarians, but it is somewhat strange to direct calls to oneself and one's supporters and in doing so reveal a certain amount of parliamentary defeatism. In addition those calling for civil disobedience should remember that such actions could at some point harm the fight against cruise missiles.

The danger that moderate people--who may also have reservations about the choice that the cabinet has made--will be frightened off is far from imaginary. The polarization caused by the cabinet and the government parties calls for determined nonviolent resistance, not wild despair.

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CSO: 5200/2547

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

FURTHER SOVIET COMMENT ON REAGAN'S INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET JOURNALISTS

PRAVDA Report

PM071631 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Nov 85 First Edition p 6

[Article by PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov. "Interview in the White House"]

[Text] Washington/Moscow -- President Reagan recently received four Soviet journalists in the White House, of whom I was one. The head of the U.S. Administration had expressed the desire to address the Soviet people through our press and IZVESTIYA granted him the opportunity. After giving written answers to the questions we had sent from Moscow, the President unfortunately allowed only half an hour for the oral interview. We were able to ask him only a very small part of what interested us.

Summing up my impressions of the answers we received, I would like first of all to note their contradictoriness. The President said our peoples must learn to live in peace, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be allowed, and that his forthcoming meeting with the Soviet leader could pave the way for nuclear arms reduction and measures directed toward the total elimination of nuclear arms. I think the Soviet people will assess these words on their merit. If they are evidence of an evolution in the White House incumbent's views, the world has a right to expect a positive response to the Soviet Union's expressed readiness to achieve a change for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations in Geneva.

But, unfortunately, the U.S. President's interview does not give a detailed, convincing answer to the question which most interests our public, and not only our public, but the public throughout the world: With what counterplans is the U.S. Administration prepared to respond to the Soviet proposals on a whole range of questions connected with the elimination of the nuclear threat?

Instead, Reagan preferred to push the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). Clearly underestimating the degree to which the Soviet people are informed about world problems, he tried to prove that the critical attitude of the international public toward the "star wars" program is explained by the fact that someone hung that supposedly unsuitable label on it. However, it is not the title that matters, but the substance. The SDI program has a perfidious aim: to give the United States the potential for making a first strike with impunity and paralyzing the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate against the aggressor.

True, in the course of the oral interview Reagan repeated several times that he has no intention of deploying the defensive "space shield" before the United States and

the USSR get rid of their offensive nuclear arms. But, in reality the "star wars" program is accompanied by an active buildup of U.S. nuclear forces: The Pentagon is creating [sozdayet] five new types of strategic delivery vehicles. Moreover, the President's words caused a commotion in Washington's corridors of power; they were in essence disclaimed by a White House spokesman, who stated that the United States does not intend to renounce its offensive potential.

The White House incumbent repeated that the purpose of SDI is to create [sozdat] a system which would threaten missiles, not people. He even expressed a readiness to share the relevant technology with other countries, if it proves possible to develop [razrabotat] it. But historical experience shows the worth of such promises. When it was creating the atom bomb, the United States not only concealed this work from the USSR -- which at that time was their ally in the war against a common enemy -- but also kept much of it quiet even from Britain, although its scientists made a substantial contribution to the implementation of the "Manhattan Project."

The President claimed that after World War II, when it was the sole possessor of atomic weapons, the United States did not think of exploiting that monopoly in its own interests. And its proposal to renounce nuclear weapons altogether was supposedly not accepted. These statements are also contrary to the truth. It was not the United States, but the USSR which, back in 1946, proposed a ban on nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles.

Washington then counterposed to the Soviet initiative the demagogic move of the so-called "Baruch plan." It was proposed to create an international body on atomic energy which would be under full U.S. control and exercise sole control of the raw materials, production, and scientific research base of the atomic industry in all countries. The purpose of the U.S. project was not to ban atomic weapons, but to perpetuate the U.S. monopoly of them. (It is also apposite to recall the "Baruch plan" in connection with the present demagoguery about readiness to make the space "nuclear shield" the common property of mankind.)

Nor do the assertions that in the first postwar years the United States did not try to take advantage of its monopoly of atomic weapons to exert pressure on the USSR correspond to reality. (The fact that it did not succeed in blackmailing our country or dictating its will to it is another matter). From fall 1945 the USSR figures in official Washington documents not only as a potential enemy, but also as a target for an atomic attack. This is indicated irrefutably by the "Halfmoon," "Offtackle," and "Dropshot" plans, which were subsequently published. They already contained the main elements of present-day U.S. military doctrine: the gamble on the first strike and forward-based means.

Since at that time the only means of delivering atom bombs was B-29 bombers, U.S. strategists set the goal of encircling the USSR with a ring of military bases. The results of their efforts are plain to see. A considerable proportion of the U.S. Armed Forces -- 550,000 servicemen -- are deployed outside the country's territory. Some 1,500 U.S. military bases have been created in 32 foreign states.

The USSR has nothing similar. That is why ground-based ICBM's became the basis of the Soviet arsenal of deterrence. The White House incumbent is now trying to depict these weapon systems as "the most destabilizing." The U.S. Administration has acquired the habit of describing in that way those means which form the basis of the USSR's combat might and declaring those in which the United States is strong -- SLBM's, heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles on board -- to be means of "stability" and

"security." Of course, we cannot agree with this classification. In terms of destructive capabilities the different types of strategic offensive weapons are now approaching each other closely and should therefore be considered and assessed as interconnected, as a united whole. The recent Soviet proposal for a radical reduction in these weapons proceeds on precisely this basis.

We told the U.S. President that the map of U.S. military bases shows clearly who encircles whom and thus who threatens whom. In the words of the White House incumbent, the United States maintains troops and has bases abroad for the sake of fulfilling its duty to its allies. It would be more accurate to say the opposite: It knocked the military blocs together precisely in order to deploy U.S. Armed Forces outside the country, create bases in strategically important regions of the world, and deploy U.S. nuclear weapons closer to our territory.

It emerged from the President's arguments that the U.S. troops are supposedly abroad only at the wish of the peoples and the invitation of the governments of the countries concerned, and that the U.S. military presence is regarded as a boon everywhere.

"And if the Cuban people hold a referendum and decide that the U.S. troops must leave the Guantanamo base will your soldiers be evacuated from there?" we asked.

"No, because the lease agreement was concluded many years ago," the President retorted, thereby canceling out the arguments he, himself had put forward.

The U.S. President's replies had something in common with his recent speech at the UN General Assembly jubilee session. It is well known that this speech was viewed in many countries as an attempt to avoid resolving the cardinal problems -- the radical reduction of nuclear arms and renunciation of the militarization of space -- and to replace them with a discussion of certain regional conflicts (at the same time bypassing the situation in the Near East and southern Africa).

In order to justify the U.S. side's desire for this change of priorities at the Geneva meeting in November, the White House boss cited an aphorism: "It is not because peoples are armed that they distrust each other. It is because they distrust each other that they are armed." To this the idea was added between the lines that the cause of regional conflicts and ultimately, of the move from detente toward confrontation was the Soviet Union's actions.

The White House boss linked tension in U.S.-Soviet relations with events in Afghanistan and Cambodia. This propaganda stereotype is by no means new. In Washington's political vocabulary legitimate assistance to peoples who have chosen the path of freedom is called "occupation." Whereas military intervention and counterrevolutionary coups committed in the interests of the U.S. imperialist circles are called "liberation." Reagan denied that it is natural for the United States to wage wars in other countries and to oppose the will of any people desiring self-determination. "However," the President added, "when we see that other peoples are threatened by external forces which could destroy their freedom and impose minority power on them by force of arms, we help them oppose that wherever we can."

If you found a naive man who took this disguised formula for the export of counterrevolution in good faith, he would have every reason for believing that Washington had supported the Vietnamese patriots against the French colonialists; or that it defended Chilean President Allende, who was elected according to all the rules of Western democracy and ousted by a fascist coup; or that it headed the struggle against the

apartheid system in South Africa, which enables the racist minority to keep millions of the country's black inhabitants in a state of slavery without rights. As we know, however, neither the first, nor the second, nor the third event occurred.

Washington not only financed the French colonists' "dirty war" in Vietnam, but in fact completely took over their shameful role. For many years a U.S. expeditionary corps numbering over 500,000 men fought in Vietnam. Over 7 million bombs were dropped on Vietnam's cities and villages. It was during this total war against the civilian population that the interventionists started using mines shaped like children's toys which are now being used by U.S. hirelings in Afghanistan. You can only feel indignant that the White House boss considered it even possible to attribute these barbaric actions to the Soviet Union.

We asked the President how he could match his claim -- that the United States has never sought to impose its will on foreign countries by force, but has only helped establish democracy there by peaceful means -- against the long list of U.S. military interventions stretching from Vietnam to Grenada? The reply to our question omitted the word "intervention." Apparently, it all began when the Geneva conference created North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The Saigon authorities asked for U.S. instructors to be sent to create an army, which Saigon had previously not had.

But from the very outset the Americans were harassed by terrorists, they were not even allowed to watch movies in peace. The advisers had to be armed and then, a military unit had to be sent to protect them. All of this grew into the Vietnam war. Furthermore, the U.S. troops never actually fought to win there. They were simply trying to maintain the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. And it was in spite of agreements between the opposing sides that it became a united state. Putting it bluntly, an original interpretation of the events! After all, the Geneva agreements on Indochina which the President cited envisaged Vietnam's unification back in 1956. It was the United States which frustrated that unification when it feverishly began arming the Saigon goons in the South and dispatching sabotage gangs with the aim of destabilizing the revolutionary power in the North.

No, it was not at all to "maintain the demilitarized zone" (which, incidentally, was not in Vietnam, but in Korea) that Washington undertook a long and bloody war. This was an attempt by the U.S. imperialist circles to take social revenge, to use arms to settle scores with a socialist state, and to forcibly deprive the people of the results of the struggle for national and social liberation.

This attempt failed. But imperialist adventures pursuing similar aims continue in our day. Examples of this are provided by the "undeclared wars" against the peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua, which are being waged using U.S. weapons and U.S. money. The Grenada invasion was a graphic example of imperial ways and of a glaring outrage against international law. Even in the wildest fantasies it is impossible to imagine that this island state could represent any threat to U.S. national security.

How did the White House boss explain this aggression when speaking with us? According to him, there were several hundred U.S. medical students on Grenada. U.S. intelligence discovered they could be taken hostage. The Grenadian Government asked for military assistance. That was when the U.S. troops landed there and they soon sorted things out: They rescued the students, established democracy on the island, and went home.

It transpires that the Grenadian Government asked to be overthrown by military force and invited foreign interventionists to occupy its own country.

After contacts and meetings with the President's closest advisers, we could not fail to be alarmed at the ease with which the White House distorts even generally known truths, at how deeply ingrained is the conviction there that the rest of the world should perceive reality only from the viewpoint of Washington's propaganda stereotypes and should either forget or just not notice those things which displease U.S. ruling circles or expose their unseemly actions.

It has always been unwise to ignore reality, but now it is also extremely dangerous. The logic that what is bad for our opponents is good for us is by no means appropriate to every dispute. In the nuclear age there are situations in which both sides lose. There are also situations in which they both win. With a nuclear threat the United States and the USSR are facing a dilemma: To exist or not to exist. I would like to hope that the sober view of things will prevail in the White House's political thinking and that this will make it possible to justify the hopes which all peoples, including the U.S. people, are pinning on the upcoming Geneva meeting.

'True Purpose of SDI'

LD061408 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 6 Nov 85

[Commentary by Vladimir Posner]

[Text] During his interview with four Soviet journalists, President Reagan caused many eyebrows to lift when explaining different aspects of American policy. One such case concerns his reasoning for the need for SDI; even if nuclear weapons are to be scrapped. Space strike weapons are needed, he said, to protect against the appearance of some kind of a madman. Vladimir Posner comments.

Well, it certainly is nice to know -- finally, and after all these months of talk -- what is the real purpose of SDI. It is not to protect the United States from the Soviet evil empire; and as we Russians say, that news is butter on my heart. I mean, it really is gratifying when you're publicly allowed out of the dog house with kind words to the effect that it's not your bite we're worried about.

Nor is SDI perceived as a shield affording protection for the side that delivers the crippling first strike. And that is good news. What the SDI proponents had, and have, in mind, what really worries them, what furnished the ultimate argument for the President's famous "star wars" speech of March 1983, was and is concern about some madman getting hold of a nuclear weapon. That is what the United States has already allowed it \$30 billion for. That is what the United States proposes to spend several hundred billion more on and invite the Soviet Union along with a lot of other countries to match those expenses. All this to thwart some hypothetical madman in the hypothetical future?

The President alluded to the war time years when our two countries were allies fighting a madman, meaning Hitler. To which, I would say this. Without some very substantial support from the West, Hitler could a) never have come to power and b) could not have begun the war. Had the West heeded the Soviet Union's repeated calls to form an anti-Nazi coalition, Hitler could simply not have happened.

The same reasoning applies today. Cooperation between the West and the socialist countries, between the United States and the Soviet Union first and foremost, is a

far more effective shield against a possible madman than SDI. And a far less expensive one at that.

The President also alluded to the post World War I Geneva Convention on the banning of poison gases. They were banned, he said, but we all kept our gas masks nevertheless. SDI would be a gas mask against the nuclear weapons of a madman. Would it? The only reason gases were not used by Hitler in World War II was the fear of retaliation.

Gas masks had nothing to do with it, not to mention the fact that the newer gases even than killed and paralyzed through contact with the skin and could not be stopped by gas masks. Similarly SDI would be a very ineffective gas mask against a madman who decided to sneak a nuclear bomb into the United States in a valise, or shoot it in in any other way, from a boat in U.S. territorial waters, for example.

No, nice as it sounds, I'm afraid President Reagan's rationale for developing SDI is -- shall we say -- not overly convincing. If the United States Administration indeed shares our desire for doing away with nuclear weapons, then it makes no sense to spend mind-boggling sums on something that is supposed to make nuclear weapons obsolete. Just agree to get rid of them on the basis of a step-by-step, mutually verifiable process. But if that is really not the aim at all, then the reality of humankind having a long and happy future on planet earth is even more hypothetical than the emergence of a madman whose spectre has now been named as the *raison d'etre* of SDI.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MOSCOW COMMENTATOR POINTS AT U.S. 'CLASS HYPOCRISY'

LD192045 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 19 Oct 85

[Commentary by Lieutenant General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, identified as "a military specialist, a doctor of philosophy, and a professor"; from the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program]

[Text] The peaceful proposals of our country put forward by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his visit to France have received a very wide response and support from level-headed people worldwide. For the world public two positions, two views toward the most acute issues of war and peace have once again been sharply contrasted. On the one hand, we have the proposals whose implementation could become a genuine program for improving the international situation. It is enough to say that a U.S. agreement to the Soviet proposal for a mutual ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space systems and a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory would create a fundamentally new situation in Soviet-American relations and would change the whole international climate.

It is also difficult to overrate the decision of the Soviet Union to bring the number of missiles in the European zone down to the level of June 1984, when the additional siting of Soviet launchers was begun in response to the United States installing its missiles in Europe. In order to facilitate an agreement on the mutual reduction of medium-range missiles in this region the Soviet Union has expressed willingness to reach an accord on these missiles separate from an agreement on space and strategic armaments.

As for steps already taken--the moratorium on nuclear testing, on the siting of medium-range missiles in Europe and others--these new initiatives have rightly been assessed by the public in many countries as an exceptionally sensible demonstration of good will by a state that has for a long time been in the vanguard of the campaign of peoples for peace.

What about Washington? What is the reaction of those who are in the upper echelons of power in the United States, those who are used to looking at the world only through the cross hairs of a gun sight? Although the White House has not given its official response to the Soviet Union's new initiatives, its reaction and attitude toward them speak for themselves. After a certain confusion, the highest-ranking state figures have come to microphones in radio

and television studios and have demonstrated striking forms of hypocrisy, yes, precisely hypocrisy. Judge for yourselves. McFarlane, the president's assistant for national security affairs, tried clumsily to prove that, as he put it, Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles cannot be brought into the strategic balance of 50 percent for 50 percent. It is as if he has forgotten that these missiles can strike the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union while our medium-range SS-20 missiles cannot threaten U.S. territory. They allege that the inclusion of U.S. medium-range missiles in the number of those that can reach the Soviet Union is, in their words, unfair. The high-ranking Washington functionaries' lack of elementary logic is plain to see.

To go on, speaking at the National Press Club in Washington and then on television, Caspar Weinberger, the Pentagon boss, went to great lengths in saying that, behind the Soviet Union's proposals there lies, as he put it, a desire to consolidate its strategic superiority. Only an increase in U.S. arms, he alleged, and the implementation of the space program will force the Soviet Union to hold honest and effective talks. In this provocative--there's no other word for it--speech by the secretary everything was old hat: lies, cheating, and falsifications regarding the real correlation of strategic nuclear forces of the two sides.

Finally the top figure, the U.S. President, also made a speech. If one discards his camouflage on the U.S. desire for a just world, then the heart of this speech appears naked in the extreme. According to the words of the speaker, it turns out that, as he puts it, the Soviet Union has been militarizing space for a long time now and that the United States has fallen dangerously behind the Russians in this respect also. The president publicized the latest falsehood of the Pentagon, prepared in September of this year, which is called "The Soviet Strategic Defense Programs," in which everything has been done to distort the real state of affairs. Virtually all that the Americans are doing in space--the creation of antisatellite weapons, the preparation of special equipment for fighting in space, and so on--all are attributed to the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to believe, but it's true, that the most downright lie is being passed off as state analysis, verified assessments, and facts. The direct deception of their countrymen is being passed off as truth. I think it is no longer necessary to comment further on the speeches made by figures from the power hierarchy in Washington. It is clear that, not wishing to give a positive response to the Soviet Union's new peaceful initiatives, official Washington is resorting to the old, hackneyed device, accusing the Soviet Union of striving for superiority and moreover claiming such a military superiority on the Soviet side.

The class hypocrisy of the inspirers of the arms race is striking. The order not to put a brake on the rotation of the military machine's fly-wheel, in order to fatten it further with the fantastical financial cake the military-industrial complex, the Strategic Defense Initiative, according to American figures, is costing \$70 billion--no laughing matter. And that is just the first stage. In order to stake its claim to hegemony in world affairs,

Washington, it appears, is prepared to go further along the taut bowstring of international tension.

As was stressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his report at the 15 October plenum of the party's Central Committee, a dangerous trend has appeared in the policy of the major imperialist states, and above all the United States. This trend finds expression in a desire to achieve military superiority over socialism, something that is exceedingly dangerous for the cause of peace. The Soviet initiatives, which have been brought to the awareness of millions of people and approved by them, have made it possible once again to tear the fig leaves of hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness from the face of militarism.

Soviet troops have a tried and tested, effective form of responding to all the dangerous challenges thrown down by militarism: supreme vigilance, a high sense of responsibility, and an unshakeable determination to perform their soldier's duty in exemplary fashion in large things and small, today and always.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: USA INSTITUTE'S ARBATOV INTERVIEWED ON SUMMIT PROSPECTS

LD102141 Moscow in English to North America 0200 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Interview by Radio Moscow commentator Vladimir Posner with Georgiy A. Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; date and place not given -- recorded]

[Text] [Posner] Dr Arbatov, what would you single out as the salient features of the forthcoming summit in Geneva?

[Arbatov] The first thing I would mention in this connection would be that this meeting will take place in a tremendously responsible moment. And it's not simply words because actually one could say that each moment for such issues as Soviet-American summit meetings must be responsible, and is responsible. But here we are really, we have...we have reached a threshold and we have to make a very important choice which will determine our fate for a very long time.

And I have in mind, first of all, that we are really on the verge of new rounds of the arms race, and a very peculiar one because science and technology brings (up) new weapons systems which will be tremendously destabilizing and can ruin the whole arms control process and all existing agreements, and all agreements to come simply. And even the talks about arms control because of many reasons, some of them are connected with the fact that this system will be unverifiable with any means, including on-site inspection. You know we have already such system, for instance, sea-based cruise missiles. You cannot verify them, they are small enough you can hide them in any attack boat or in any ship, merchant ship, wherever you want. And then, you know, they will be destabilizing in essence because many of them are first strike weapons. And then they will (?foster) also proliferation, nuclear proliferation process, which is also of tremendous danger for the world. So I think a meeting at this moment makes, also provides, for a certain agenda.

Of course, the first item on agenda had to be what to do with the arms race, how to stop it. Actually, even Reagan administration in (?the) last months more than once proclaimed this as their goal, of their intention, contrary to what they said at first when they were against any agreements, against talks with Soviet Union [words indistinct] were openly for achieving superiority, military superiority. Then I would say also, you know, there are some really very serious trends in the world development and we somehow are so overwhelmed with the issues of East-West relations and Soviet-American relations that I think not enough attention is paid to them by public.

I think it is very well felt by Soviet leadership that, for instance, the situation in so-called Third World, in developing countries, becomes absolutely impossible, desperate. So I think there are more than one reason to regard the situation as critical. And in this critical situation two major participants of international relations which have no special rights or privileges, but have special responsibility, I think they have a lot of things to discuss and to (?resolve).

[Posner] How would you characterize in essence the approach to the summit on the part of the Soviet Union and on the part of the United States?

[Arbatov] I would characterize it as a very different one, even opposing.

Well we started not only, with you know, with very much care about rhetorics and about what is being said on the subject, but with some very, I would say, substantial deeds like unilateral decisions to stop all nuclear explosions, all tests of nuclear weapons up (?till) 1st January; with a proposal to Americans to join us and then to make it permanent and together with it to start this negotiations on comprehensive test ban, test ban treaty, again to resume this negotiations.

Then we proposed, we took upon ourselves, commitment, we made a commitment not to test any antisatellite weapons. We called for a moratorium on antisatellite weapons for everybody, including Americans. We made new proposals of very radical cuts in nuclear weapons to the Geneva conference. Gorbachev made also some new, I would say more than gestures, We unilaterally decreased the number of SS-20's aimed at Europe. We also put forward, it was explained by Gorbachev in Paris at his meeting with, in the parliament, a new concept of European security and with the major idea that you cannot ensure security, national security and international security, with force or against somebody. You can do it only by political means and together with others, which is I think very important, a new, new concept actually of international relations in nuclear age. So all of it was done, and what was the reaction from American side?

It was astonishing, you know. We proposed to stop, we stopped nuclear testing, they almost demonstratively test one and then another device. We stop the testing of anti-satellite weapons, they immediately declare that they will test, they have nothing ready even at the moment, but they insist (?on this). It was as if, you know, as a demonstration that they will against, against all the mood in the country.

But I think (?then) a few weeks passed and it started to dawn upon Americans that you cannot [word indistinct] this in such a way, and they turned down a little bit this whole rhetoric and started to accommodate to the situation because this policy of Soviet Union, really it had, it impressed the public. Also in the United States it even started discussion in the administration, although we have very conservative administration at the moment, but even there (?a) discussion was, as one can understand, started by all of it. So, I would say here we see two different lines. I think that our line was more successful and therefore maybe the Americans do it a little differently, though you can never be sure about them. They can you know with this (?in-fight) which seems to go on in the administration, this tremendous, you know, influence of real extremists, people who are on the extreme right of the whole political spectrum, beyond them are only maybe splinter group of fascists, outright fascists, racists and exotic organizations you know, like that. [passage as received]

[Posner] Dr Arbatov, speaking of extremists in the administration, there seems to be a view that the Soviet Union will have to limit its arms, limit arms, and cut back on arms because of the situation in the economy and that therefore arms limitations and arms reduction are only in the interests of the Soviet Union. What is your opinion about that view?

[Arbatov] I consider this point of view to be wrong and very primitive. The Soviet economy is strong enough to ensure not such as fast as we would like it to (?heed), but steady improvement of living conditions, of standard of life, and at the same time care about its defense. We have shown this in much more difficult times, so one can be sure that we will be able to do it even now. And well, we are very honest about it. Yes we would prefer to spend each ruble we spend on missiles, or guns, or tanks on kindergartens, or on agriculture, or on education, or on building new theaters, or on the needs of the people. But I think it is without any doubt I don't think Americans believe now, aside from some really fanatical communist hater, that they can ruin us in such a way. And then more and more Americans understand I think that in attempts to ruin us in this way the Americans will only halfway to this goal ruin themselves, and we see it already.

And you know, it's not only because they have such a greedy military industrial complex, it would be unimaginable in the Soviet Union that a plant sells to our Ministry of Defense a hammer for \$400, or a toilet seat for \$700. I even don't speak about this. We see already how these tremendous military expenditures have already induced very big (?drain) on American economy and this national deficit, national debt, which leads also to negative balance of payment and trade balance, which leads to deterioration of many traditional industries in the United States, structural crisis as it is called by economists. And it costs also a lot to West Europeans, to the allies, because their allies -- actually almost a half of this deficit is paid by foreign money because of the high interest rate and rate of dollar the money is pumped from Western Europe there instead of going into investments in Western Europe. And I told (?them) already about consequences for developing world, so it becomes a world problem.

I think that really, from many points of view -- moral, political, military and even economic -- an arms race like this which is going on now has become a luxury which we cannot afford any more, not only we but Americans as well.

[Posner] A final question, which people are talking about most nowadays, what do you expect from the summit? Would you care to predict its outcome?

[Arbatov] It's very difficult always to predict outcomes, outcome of events, especially they that that they will happen in the (?near) future, much easier to do it if they will happen a century or 2 later. But, you know, I think that actually, it's not a game, not a sports event when you can make bets on what will be the outcome. It is a necessity, this meeting has become a necessity, this summit. And I know how our side, our leadership, looks at it. It wants it to have serious results. It won't be satisfied with a meeting which will deteriorate into a political show -- handshakes, smiles and then make believe that everything went okay. We do want real results from it, and I won't say that we have too much hopes about it, and we have no illusions from the beginning, but we felt that we have to try it. In this dangerous situation one has to use each chance, as slim as it could be. And the second point, I think there is real need for a real test, sort of litmus test, for American policy, for American President, for American Administration, what they really are up to. And I think their real face either more beautiful than one could expect or more ugly than one could have expected, will become much more obvious after the summit than before, because here will be the moment of truth, to some degree.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET WEEKLY HITS U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET INITIATIVE

PM301201 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 44, 25-31 Oct 85 (Signed to Press
24 Oct 85) p 1

[Editorial: "Inspiring and Realistic Program"]

[Excerpts] The broad peace-loving public, alarmed at the further deterioration in the international situation, has found inspiring hope in recent weeks. The new important and far-reaching Soviet proposals advanced at the beginning of October create a basis for overcoming the impasse into which the whole world is deliberately being driven by the henchmen of the American military-industrial complex in Washington, who have adopted a policy of sharply exacerbating the world confrontation by shifting the unrestrained nuclear arms race into space. Not only numerous mass working people's organizations but also statesmen of many countries, including those belonging to the NATO bloc, have approved the Soviet leader's bold and large-scale decision.

Washington's Self-Exposure

Although the top representatives of the present American administration have repeatedly and loudly proclaimed their desire to "radically reduce" nuclear arms, they have never thought seriously of halting the nuclear arms race which they have intensified and shifted into space. Having made American taxpayers fork out almost \$2 trillion for the Pentagon over the next 5 years and brought the country to the brink of financial ruin--the United States has become a debtor for the first time since 1914--Washington intends to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union so as to impose still more acute and risky confrontation on it.

After several days' confusion and indistinct numbling about "further discussion" of the Soviet proposals Washington mounted a real campaign against them, mobilizing its "top cadres"--presidential aides, secretaries, and their closest accomplices who are particularly skilled at fanning enmity and hatred toward the Soviet Union. Attempts were made to denigrate the Soviet proposals, on the one hand, as "insignificant" and, on the other, as allegedly "disarming" unhappy America by depriving it of the possibility of making a first strike against the socialist countries. Their special indignation was aroused by the possibility of losing West Europe as a bridgehead for a "limited" nuclear war.

At the same time there was an increase in the noisy ballyhoo over the firm Soviet demand, supported by the international public, for a total ban on the deployment of nuclear arms in space. One after another the president, his secretaries, and other high-ranking American figures swear with uncommon solemnity that they will not permit encroachments on their "Strategic Defense Initiative," that is, the militarization of space. In addition to these oaths, sworn in direct violation of the January Soviet-American agreement, daily groundless claims are made that this "initiative," which enables American nuclear forces in space to shoot down any flying object and attack missiles of any country in any place, brings all mankind peace and splendor for centuries to come. The primitive attempts to imitate the priest who re-named a piglet a carp, by making not only Americans and West Europeans but also the whole world believe in the Washington fairytale about the "beneficial" nature of the militarization of space, attest to the total loss of a sense of reality.

Not confining itself to feverish propaganda stunts, with its characteristic stridency Washington set the president's closest colleague up on a rostrum and entrusted him, in direct opposition to the letter and spirit of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, with announcing that that treaty permits and gives its blessing to the U.S.-favored militarization of space. Such gross distortion of the treaty caused irritation even among the always loyal and obedient U.S. NATO allies, who found it necessary to remind the presumptuous American bawlers that signed treaties should be treated less cynically. And once again, after some confusion, dodging and backing down, Washington was forced to admit that the "new interpretation"--in other words, the attempt to distort the treaty--was "too broad."

The well thought out, realistic, reasonable Soviet program, which ensures equal security for all and takes account of the interests of all countries and peoples, gives hope to peace-loving forces throughout the planet, inspiring the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to normalize international relations.

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SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS

PM051031 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Nov 85 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Soldatenko article: "'Star Wars' Versus 'Star Peace'"]

[Text] Since 1947 the cover of the U.S. journal BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS has regularly featured a symbolic "nuclear age clock." Its hands show how close mankind is to "midnight" -- the nuclear threat hanging over the planet -- depending on the "warming" or "cooling" of the climate of the international situation.

Initially the clock showed "7 minutes to midnight." The hands have only moved 20 minutes away from the fatal hour -- the furthest of all -- on two occasions: in 1963, when the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was signed and in 1972, after the signing by the USSR and the United States of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). But in recent years the clock's hands have again approached the fatal "midnight." They now show "4 minutes to midnight." Of course, the "nuclear age clock" is a metaphor, but it does have a definite meaning: To an extremely dangerous extent mankind is approaching a nuclear catastrophe.

"The causes of the growth of tension and military danger," the Warsaw Pact statement unanimously adopted at the Political Consultative Committee conference (1985) notes, "lie in the policy of imperialism; first and foremost, U.S. imperialism which makes no secret of the fact that it is aiming to achieve military superiority in order to dictate its will to other peoples and states." However, nobody can turn back the course of history. In passing many stern tests, the Soviet State has proved the ability and advantages of the socialist system.

The Soviet Union is a fundamental opponent of competition in the military sphere. "Disarmament is the socialist idea," V.I. Lenin stressed, thereby highlighting the disarmament process as a specific task for a socialist state. And it is precisely thanks to the immense efforts of the USSR and the other socialist community countries that it was possible in the seventies to turn the development of international relations toward detente.

However, the detente process had several fervent enemies in the West, particularly in the form of the ringleaders of the U.S. military-industrial complex. They did everything to slow the development of positive processes and to resolve by force the historic dispute between capitalism and socialism to their own advantage. In an attempt to remove the obstacles in the way of achieving military superiority, the

U.S. Administration refused to ratify the Soviet-U.S. Salt II treaty already signed by the heads of state, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974), and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976).

The U.S. Administration has started reinforcing its course of acquiring military superiority with demonstrative actions that run counter to the Soviet peace proposals. Thus, the Americans have carried out six nuclear weapons tests in response to the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and the United States responded to the moratorium adopted by the Soviet Union in 1983 on launching antisatellite weapons into space with a test of the ASAT antisatellite system against a real target in space.

Recently, the USSR has issued a wide-ranging program of new peace initiatives, including an initiative on reducing by 50 percent the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territories.

For its part the Soviet Union would reduce one-half of its strategic offensive arms (it has 2,504 in all) comprising ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. The USSR has no other nuclear arms capable of reaching U.S. territory.

The United States has 2,210 units [yedinitsy] of strategic offensive arms. Moreover, it has 1,149 units of medium-range and forward-based nuclear arms -- Pershing-2 missiles, GLCM's, and nuclear-capable tactical and carrier-borne aircraft -- which can reach a considerable proportion of the USSR's territory and with regard to our country are essentially a substantial addition to the U.S. strategic potential.

As a result of the implementation of the Soviet proposal the arsenals of the sides' strategic offensive means would be considerably reduced -- the USSR would have 1,250 and the United States 1,680 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. At the same time it is proposed, in the interests of ensuring approximate strategic equilibrium, that there should be identical numbers of warheads -- 6,000 each -- on the remaining means.

Naturally, the Soviet proposal can only be implemented if agreement is reached on a total ban on space strike arms. And this particularly does not suit the United States, which sees a technological breakthrough in space -- via the implementation of the "star wars" plans -- as a way to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The thrust of the work within the framework of the "star wars" program is rightly causing profound alarm among the world public and even among many well-known U.S. specialists. They state quite reasonably that under cover of the "defensive" nature of this "initiative," the Washington administration intends to develop [razrabatyvat] and create [sozdavat], in violation of the ABM Treaty, not only a "nuclear shield" for U.S. first-strike missiles but, first and foremost, offensive space weapons. "The systems being developed [razrabatayvayemye] under the 'star wars' program are not purely defensive," R. Bowman, president of the Institute for the Study of the Problems of Space and Security, stresses. "Such definitions are inappropriate for them. They are capable of attacking any target in space and, perhaps, even on other countries' territories."

It is to that end that, within the framework of the "star wars" program, the United States is stepping up its testing of a nuclear charge to excite an X-ray laser. The Pentagon's latest "brainchild" intended for use in space is a new step not only in expanding the ways of using nuclear weapons, but also in the space marathon of the arms race. To that end, work is under way at the Lawrence Livermore radiation

laboratory, the Sandia national laboratory, and the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory, where thousands of scientists are creating "third-generation" nuclear weapons. In the words of R. Wagner, assistant to the U.S. secretary of defense for atomic energy, in these fundamentally new means of mass destruction the "energy of the nuclear explosion will be partially transformed into a more suitable form than the blast wave and the release of heat typical of the weapons of the past." Among the innovations with a "regulated" strike effect are charges which, in order to hit the target, use a specially directed plasma beam from a concentrated nuclear explosion or a highly amplified electromagnetic pulse.

According to U.S. press figures, work in these areas in the United States is currently being conducted on 22 programs, while the creation [sozdaniye] of 12 new types of nuclear munitions is directly linked with nuclear tests. The same Wagner tries to justify similar militarist preparations by citing the need to do everything possible to ensure that "the USSR feels weaker than us and in the event of a crisis would be firmly convinced that it cannot match our strength. This is much more than the usual question about numbers of missiles, or their size and effectiveness."

U.S. experts believe that the number of nuclear munitions in the U.S. strategic offensive forces, even by the most cautious estimates, will grow by 40-50 percent in the first half of the nineties, with the entire arsenal of delivery vehicles being qualitatively renewed at the same time. That is why the U.S. military-political leadership is not interested in achieving a real ban on strategic arms.

According to information in the U.S. press, the White House now cannot decide just how it ought to act in response to the USSR's proposal to embark on major reductions in nuclear forces on the condition of real restrictions on U.S. "research" in the sphere of space strike arms. That is, how to respond to the "star peace" concept which the Soviet Union has put forward as a counterweight to the sinister U.S. "star wars" plans.

With the help of a selection of "theses" and "arguments" that have already been used, the Pentagon is advising the President "to try to shoot down" the USSR's peace offensive without changing his position on the questions of the military use of space. Other advisers are recommending that the White House incumbent should not reject the Soviet proposals immediately. Even if the United States goes as far as talks with the Russians on the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," they say, it is still risking nothing. If only because the "star wars" program is so complex and wide-ranging and is planned for such a long period that it is always possible to find a suitable temporary formula which would pacify the USSR and the world public without fearing a ban on antimissile developments [razrabotki]. At the same time, this formula would allow the United States to continue "research" within the SDI framework.

But however cunning the heralds of the U.S. military-industrial complex are in justifying the aggressive U.S. actions by citing the alleged "impossibility of negotiating with [dogovoritsya] Moscow," they cannot deceive mankind. For the USSR's responsible and constructive approach to settling the most complex problems of the day is winning increasing sympathy and support in the international community; first and foremost, its approach to preventing an arms race in space, limiting it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

Today these words of Lenin's retain their topicality: "In the most solemn and official way and on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, we have declared our peaceful intentions... Let the U.S. capitalists leave us alone. We will not touch them." It was this thought that M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in his replies to TIME magazine: "On behalf of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people I would like once again to tell all Americans the most important thing for them to know: "War will never come from the Soviet Union, we will never start one."

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

ZAGLADIN ASSESSES U.S., USSR 'DIFFERENCES' IN TOKYO INTERVIEW

OW111407 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1200 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Interview with Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by reporter Kenichi Iida of the NHK special news department at the CPUS Central Committee building in Moscow; date of interview not given; conducted in Russian with Japanese subtitles; translated from Russian -- recorded]

[Text] [Iida] There are considerable differences between the United States and the USSR on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Can it be assumed that the talks at the coming summit meeting in Geneva will help reduce these differences?

[Zagladin] The differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be broken into two parts on this issue. The first part deals with the principle itself, the principle of whether it is necessary to strive for the nonmilitarization of space and the reduction of nuclear arms together or whether this process can continue. We think that the process must be stopped. Though the U.S. says it is also striving for this end, rather it is actually continuing both.

The second type of difference deals with details; about what kind of arms must be included, what can be reduced and by how much. It is clear these second differences can be overcome easily. Not easily of course, time and effort will be needed for that; we have experience, agreements -- SALT I, SALT II. There have been complicated problems and they have been overcome. They were overcome under this condition: On the condition that both sides agreed on the first group of differences. That means both sides came to the conclusion that it was necessary to follow the path of cessation of the arms race. That is how it was then. If both sides come to that conclusion now, then the talks will be successful. Personally, we are completely ready for such an occurrence. The matter now depends on the political will of the U.S. side. If it agrees to this approach, I am convinced that, with efforts and a thorough discussion of the issues, of course, the differences of the second order, the military-technical ones, can be overcome too.

[Iida] We know that at the coming summit meeting in Geneva, U.S. President Reagan plans to include among central issues at the talks regional problems like Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and so forth. What do you think about that and what is the central issue that will be advanced by the Soviet Union?

[Zagladin] We have never been against discussion of regional problems. We think that regional conflicts must be stopped, liquidated. This is one of the conditions for consolidating peace. But the President enumerated what you have said and forgot about the Middle East and southern Africa. He forgot them not by accident, it would seem. But,

the main point lies somewhere else. The main point is that the central issues in the talks, in our view -- and we intend to make them the central issues in the talks -- are the issues of disarmament as they were formulated in the Soviet-U.S. agreement of 8 January this year: preventing the militarization of space and reducing arms on earth. These are the problems we intend to make central in the talks. I repeat that this does not mean we will refuse to discuss other issues -- most probably we will raise some other issues and the U.S. side, too -- but the disarmament issues must be the central ones. The main thing is to do the most that is possible to achieve a turning point in international relations from confrontation to normal peaceful development of relations between states.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: DRAFT CPSU PROGRAM VIEW OF ARMS RACE DETAILED

LD050016 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Nov 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast; talk by APN political observer Spartak Beglov]

[Text] The 41st year without war has begun. This is the longest period of peace in this century for our people and for the majority of the population on earth. As the new draft edition of the CPSU Program stresses, this is the result of the peace-loving foreign policy course consistently pursued by the Soviet State, combined with a strengthening of the country's defense capability. At the same time, as clearly follows from the entire content of the principal theoretical political document of the CPSU, socialism is becoming established on earth and, not just in order that peace may be a breathing space between wars, our party states that it will continue to do everything in its power to preserve peace and the creative labor of the Soviet people and to halt the arms race which has overwhelmed the world.

Many aspects of world events attest to the fact that the world is going through a critical moment. Our party is doing everything possible so that this might be a turning point for the better. At the same time, a characteristic of the draft new edition of the CPSU Program is the profoundly realistic appraisal of the situation which has arisen. Never before has there been such a menacing danger threatening mankind, the document stresses. However, never before have the possibilities for preserving and consolidating peace been so great.

The party's program document clearly defines the main allies in the struggle for a peaceful future for mankind. These are the world system of socialism, the international worker and communist movement, states that have been liberated from colonial dominion, and, finally, the mass democratic antiwar movement in the nonsocialist world. The Soviet action program is simple and concrete: The CPSU solemnly states there is no weapon that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to restrict or ban on a mutual basis, using effective monitoring. The Soviet Union is defending a world in which the principles of peaceful coexistence would become the norms in international relations. The draft new edition of the CPSU Program is a clear and precise statement by our party about what it is striving for and what it is fighting for in the name of man and peace on earth.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS NOTES GORBACHEV REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM WORLD LEADERS

LD071751 Moscow TASS in English 1748 GMT 7 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 7 TASS -- As it has already been reported, heads of state and government of six countries have sent a joint message to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Follows the answer of Mikhail Gorbachev to the message:

"To Mr Raul Alfonsin, president of Argentina,
To Mr Miguel de la Madrid, president of Mexico,
To Mr Olof Palme, prime minister of Sweden,
To Mr Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India,
To Mr Julius Nyerere,
To Mr Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece.

Dear Sirs,

Your joint message has been examined most attentively by the Soviet leaders. It confirms the fact that we have common goals, that your proposals dealing with the curtailment of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and the prevention of the militarization of space are consonant with our approach.

You repose hopes, and with good reason, in the coming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and expect it to bring about positive changes in international relations. On our part, we actively come out for reaching at the meeting concrete, tangible agreements that would promote the consolidation of security and trust in the world, that would open up a possibility to stop the accelerating process of the accumulation and further improvement of armaments. This is what peoples are waiting for.

Realizing its responsibility for the destinies of the world, the Soviet Union has come up with a package of new initiatives practically in all the spheres of the termination of the arms race and of disarmament. We have stated that we are ready to agree to the reduction by half of the Soviet and American nuclear armaments reaching the territories of each other if the creation of space strike weapons is banned.

This is the real practical formula of preventing the arms race in space and of truly drastic reductions of nuclear armaments on earth. The USSR also took unilaterally, lately in particular, a number of steps which are well known.

I would like to touch upon the question on which you lay special emphasis in your message, namely, that of declaring by the USSR and the United States of a 12-month moratorium on nuclear explosions.

We share your assessment of the importance of this measure. You link with good reason the termination of the tests with hopes for erecting a reliable barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race, with a turn towards eliminating in practice nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the cessation of the nuclear tests would make it possible steeply to slow down and in many respects preclude practical work to upgrade qualitatively nuclear weapons, develop their new types and enhance their destructive as it is effect. In such conditions the nuclear arms race would be tangibly undermined.

This is the reason why the Soviet Union attaches so much importance to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, works perseveringly and consistently to achieve this.

Striving to lead the resolution of this problem out of the deadlock, the USSR unilaterally terminated starting August 6 this year any nuclear explosions either. So, whether the Soviet moratorium will continue to be in effect after the mentioned date expires depends totally on the United States.

There exists now a real possibility to take at last a decisive and historic, in the full sense of this word, step to stop the tests once and for all. As for the Soviet Union, I repeat that we could go to the prolongation of our moratorium after January 1, 1986 if the United States joins it. Moreover, we are prepared already now, today, for a timeless treaty ban on all nuclear weapon tests.

If political will is displayed, it would be quite possible, we believe, to solve the question concerning verification. The present state of national technical means in possession of the USSR and the United States allows the sides to determine without difficulty whether nuclear tests are conducted or not. Facts of the most recent time confirm this.

In addition, in reaching an accord on banning nuclear weapon tests totally and universally, other mutually acceptable verification methods too, including those involving the use of the possibilities which are mentioned in your message, could be looked for.

The solution of the problem of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, as well as a temporary moratorium on the nuclear tests, require steps towards each other, the taking into account of each other's security interests. Any hopes to achieve unilateral advantages in this sphere are groundless.

We continue to believe in the effect of a good example, in the triumph of common sense which should get an upper hand in the long run when the point at issue is the problem connected with the very existence of the civilization.

I should like to express hope that the efforts in this direction stimulated by the opinion of the influential leaders of the states -- signatories to the Delhi Declaration representing various continents on our planet will bear fruit. You can always count on the Soviet Union in this noble work.

M. Gorbachev

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RELATED ISSUES

KGB CHIEF SPEECH AT REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY ON PEACE, SECURITY

LD061554 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Nov 85 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report on speech by Viktor Mikhaylovich Chebrikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman, Committee for State Security, entitled "Under the Banner of October to New Frontiers in the Perfection of Socialism," which he read at the 6 November festive meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution]

[Excerpts]

Comrades, 68 years ago the Russian proletariat in alliance with the poorest peasantry, under the leadership of the Leninist party, made a victorious breakthrough into the future. An event of world historic significance took place, the Great October Socialist Revolution [GOSR]. The October Revolution is a revolution of social justice. It was the embodiment of the deepest aspirations of people of labor, of their desire for freedom, equality, and happiness. Exploitation of man by man, social and national lack of rights, unemployment, and illiteracy became irreversibly things of the past. For the first time in history there was born a state that is governed by the working people themselves and where the friendship of all the peoples united therein has been firmly entrenched.

2. Safeguarding Security and Preserving Peace

Comrades, the new, extremely responsible tasks facing the country have to be carried out in conditions where the international situation remains complex and tense. The mountains of armaments continue to grow. Possible accords are blocked. Crisis and conflict situations in various parts of the world continue to exist and sometimes intensify. Anxiety and concern for the future, caused by the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, are poisoning the lives of people on the planet. Why has the situation in the world turned out like this? There are many reasons for this; but the main thing, the fundamental thing, is that imperialism has not withstood the test of detente. It considered detente dangerous for the fate of capitalism in the historic dispute with the world of socialism. Detente requires a serious restructuring of both political thinking and political behavior and requires responsibility and restraint in international affairs.

It is not compatible with imperial ambitions or with attempts, relying on force and taking no account of the interests of other states, to interfere in their internal affairs.

Unfortunately, the NATO country capitals, and primarily Washington, have been unable to rise to such a level of understanding of relaxation of tension. They did not wish to acknowledge the degree to which the changes which have taken place in the world are objectively conditioned. Having adopted a course of socio-political revenge [revansh], they have managed in a short time to destroy and break up much of the positive that was created with such labor in the 1970's.

The exacerbation of Soviet-American relations called forth by this led to a general deterioration of the political climate in the world and an increase in the military danger.

Our country counterposes to imperialism's course of confrontation and aggression its own peace-loving, honest, and clear position. This has been forged by history itself. Soviet Russia entered the world stage under the Leninist banner of peace. We propose peace, just and democratic peace. War was unleashed against us, attempts were made to grip us by the throat.

We proposed peaceful coexistence. Weapons were fired against us, blockades and sanctions were applied. We proposed, and still do propose, mutually beneficial cooperation. In reply, we receive attempts to undermine our economy, to bring about the erosion and softening of socialism and bring us to our knees.

However, we have survived and withstood everything, and are stronger in the struggle. This year mankind has marked the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism. In the Great Patriotic War we did not win just a military victory; this was the victory of our socialist order and of the unprecedented steadfastness and heroism of the Soviet people and its glorious Armed Forces, educated by the Leninist party.

And today also, the memory of the innumerable sacrifices which our country sustained in that mortal combat, demands unshakeable firmness in the defense of peace. We must fight against war before it begins. And this is how we are acting.

In the nuclear age there is not, and there cannot be, any political aim which it would be possible to attain by embarking upon a nuclear missile collision. In such a collision there would be no victors; moreover, there would be no vanquished. For this reason, defending peace and preventing a third world war is, in our time, a question of life and death for mankind, a question of whether the history of civilization will continue or whether a thermonuclear stop will be put to it. The situation which has come about renders the arms race absurd. Why accumulate weapons whose use would mean committing suicide? Mankind is tired of living under the Damoclean sword of nuclear megatons. Only a halt to the arms race and a transition to disarmament can make our world more stable and provide a real possibility for the resolution of the global problems which are becoming increasingly acute. There is no reasonable alternative to this, and the party Central Committee and the Soviet Government are consistently being guided by such considerations in their foreign policy.

Without stopping its attempts to present the intentions of our country in a false light, imperialist propaganda is again and again setting in motion the myth -- hackneyed since as far back as the times of the October Revolution -- of the Soviet military threat. It is appropriate to recall what Vladimir Ilich Lenin wrote on this question: "There are stupid people who shout about Red militarism. They are political swindlers who pretend that they believe this stupidity, and who cast to the right and the left such accusations, using for this purpose their advocate's skill to create false arguments and kick sand in the eyes of the masses."

All of us Soviet people love our system engendered by October. We are convinced of its historic advantages, but we do not intend to impose it upon anyone. We favor competing in peaceful labor and favor peoples making their own choice, not obliged by force of arms, but attracted by the force of example. We function in accordance with this and will continue to function in this way in the future.

Our Leninist foreign policy is typified by the absence of sudden jolts and adventures, strict observance of treaty obligations, and a high degree of predictability. The Soviet land is a reliable partner in the world community. At the same time, and I would like to lay special emphasis upon this: Immobility and routine are alien to the CPSU foreign policy course. Rather, it is distinguished by flexibility and boldness of initiatives, firmness in defending our people's interests, and parallel to that with a deep understanding of the security requirements of the other peoples, of the whole world. There is a natural link, in that the growing dynamism of domestic life is accompanied by a stepping up of the Soviet state's foreign policy activity and its efforts directed at improving the international atmosphere. The steps recently taken by the Soviet Union are an entire complex of large-scale and constructive measures aimed at arranging normal relations between states.

Our peace initiatives and proposals have received a big reception in the world, especially following Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's official visit to France. They are imbued with a feeling of responsibility and show an understanding of the reality of the contemporary situation. They observe the fundamental principles of equality and identical security of the parties. A balance of reasonable compromises is maintained. Such is the Soviet power's entire approach to international questions, an approach that is broad, unprejudiced, and that takes account of the variety in the world and the legitimate interests of the states that comprise it.

It is not without irritation that they in imperialist circles refer to all this as the Soviet Union's peace offensive. It should be said openly that we would be happy if peace initiatives became the only form of offensive action in the international arena.

In putting forward new ideas and new proposals aimed at reviving detente in Europe and throughout the world, the Soviet leadership considers them a means of creating a political atmosphere that may promote an increase in trust and mutual understanding. And how does the other side answer? With new nuclear explosions, the comprehensive testing of an antimissile system, and a lack of desire to conduct talks on averting the militarization of space. Toughness, lack of compromise, and military force are being demonstrated intentionally. The Pentagon is openly banking on using the latest scientific-technical achievements to achieve military and strategic superiority over our country. This is the sense of the "star wars" program, of taking the arms race into space. There has never been such a dangerous undertaking over the entire history of armaments which takes the world right up to a limit which simply must not be crossed.

Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot fail to take the U.S. militaristic actions into account; and as long as the war danger endures, we are obliged to maintain the Soviet state's defense capability at the required level. The Soviet Union will never permit the military and strategic equilibrium to be destroyed or the achievement of superiority over itself. Let no one doubt that our homeland's security and that of its allies will be properly safeguarded.

As is known, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva is due to be held very soon. The CPSU Central Committee and the Government of the USSR attach great importance to it and are doing everything to ensure that it yields tangible results.

We believe that if political courage is shown and if we meet each other halfway, it will still be possible to put a lot of things right. In any event, in Geneva the Soviet side will seek to achieve a just and constructive solution of the most vital problems of the present day.

But, however the situation unfolds, we shall continue persistently to steer towards the expansion of mutual understanding and cooperation in all fields with the states of Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific basins, with friendly India, Japan, and other neighbors of ours. One should also not leave out a particular mention of countries and regions where imperialism is conducting secret and overt, albeit undeclared, wars. I have in mind Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the peoples of which are compelled to carry out the armed defense of their revolution against imperialist mercenaries. I have in mind the Near East, which the United States and Israel strive to keep in an explosive state and where they provoke fratricidal conflicts. I have in mind southern Africa, where the already unsteady apartheid regime is attempting to prolong its days by carrying out bloody repressions on its own population and piratical aggressive forays against neighboring states.

The freedom-loving peoples of these and other countries which are struggling for independence and progress and for the right to choose their destiny can be certain of our unwavering and effective solidarity.

The Soviet Union intends consistently to try to achieve the establishment of a different and more secure situation in the world. We have made the necessary steps. Now it is up to the West to take steps in reply. The stance of the United States and the NATO countries will show whether they have matured sufficiently for this. The responsibility is everyone's no one can remain a detached observer. As was said by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, "we are all the keepers of the fire of life passed on to us by preceding generations."

Celebrating the glorious anniversary of Great October, it is with satisfaction that we note that the country of the soviets is conducting its peaceloving foreign policy course in close unity with the fraternal countries of the socialist community. This community is an example of relations between states of a new type, based on unity of ideology, fundamental interests, and aims, and on mutual aid and comradely solidarity. Our party has attached and attaches prime importance to the perfection of these relations. The Soviet Union strives to develop varied cooperation with all other socialist states as well. We are not relaxing our efforts aimed at improving relations with the PRC. The recently held regular conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states demonstrated once again the states' responsible approach to the issues which are most important for mankind, the issues of war and peace. The leaders of the allied states reaffirmed their resolve to continue to act jointly, sparing no energies, to strive for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, for a reduction in the level of military confrontation, and for ensuring the reliable security of all peoples.

Summing up what has been said about international affairs, it should be stressed that time is working against those who are trying to block detente and the transition to disarmament and peaceful cooperation. In fact, the forces of peace are growing and multiplying; and the world of socialism, the mightiest among them, is becoming stronger. The communists of all continents are in the forefront of the struggle to preserve peace in the world. The contribution of the countries which are part of the Nonaligned Movement to this struggle is increasing. The antiwar movement, unprecedented in its scope and mass character, is closing its ranks. The socialist and social-democratic parties, trade unions, other public organizations, and realistically minded politicians

in the West are coming out more and more energetically against a policy fraught with the danger of war. An understanding of the senselessness and danger of the attempts to resolve disputes between peoples by military means, and all the more between differing socioeconomic systems, is becoming predominant in the mood of the international public. People want to live, and live in peace. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, no difficulties, no subversive maneuvers undertaken by the most aggressive, militaristic circles of imperialism, will force us to turn from our chosen path. We are convinced that the international situation can be changed for the better, and we call upon all peaceloving forces and all states to act in this direction. Peace, the planet, and civilization can be preserved. And our party, our state, and our people have sufficient endurance, strength, and will for this.

Comrades, 68 years of struggle and victories are behind us. We can be justly proud of the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people. Before us lie fresh horizons of social progress. Relying on everything that was brought by the revolution, that was created and defended in the post-October period, a steep ascent must be made in the social and economic development of Soviet society; we must go forward faster.

The party is certain that any heights of social creativity are within the power of the heirs of October. Glory to the great Soviet people! Long live the CPSU, the party of innovators and creators! Under the red banner of October, forward to fresh victories!

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA'S BOVIN CONTRASTS U.S., SOVIET ARMS CONCEPTS

PM081733 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9, 10 Nov 85 Morning Editions

[9 Nov 85 p 7]

[First part of a two-part article by Aleksandr Bovin under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "Two Concepts, Two Approaches"]

[Text] I.

In the course of disarmament talks it is necessary to deal with the analysis and comparison of factual data and important statistical material (the comparison of strategic potentials in quantitative and qualitative terms, calculations of effectiveness and of the effect on the sides' security of various options for reduction, and so on, and so forth).

All these are relatively complex procedures which reflect objective difficulties in the path of disarmament. But experience has shown that these difficulties are surmountable. They are surmountable given a conscientious approach, the desire and ability to cover the whole range of problems, and -- most important -- the desire to reach agreement.

At the same time, the complex, multilayered, and heterogeneous nature of the data which have to be examined and taken into account creates opportunities for individual indicators to be taken out of the general context and for arbitrary manipulation of figures. That is exactly what they often do in Washington, where it is currently fashionable to manipulate all kinds of tables and graphs and blind the public with arithmetical revelations. Fortunately for them, the public can by no means always comprehend them.

I will give two examples.

In 1979, when the SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna, the sides exchanged official information about their strategic forces. The Americans mentioned, in particular, 573 heavy bombers, while we had 156. Since then, no substantial divergences from these figures have been recorded. But now listen to Robert McFarlane, the U.S. President's national security adviser. It seems the Americans have only 263 machines, while the Soviet Union has 480.

What has happened? Objectively nothing. It is simply McFarlane being cunning. He counts only those U.S. heavy bombers which are attached to combat units. Although the treaty states clearly that all machines are counted -- both those which are in reserve and those which are either in storage or mothballed.

And why has the Soviet Union's number of machines trebled? Because, in violation of the Vienna accord, McFarlane has started counting not only the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev heavy bombers, but also the medium-range machines known in the West as Backfires. So that is the arithmetic.

Another example. Answering Soviet journalists' questions, the U.S. President noted that in Europe, if you have medium-range weapons in mind, the Soviet Union has a seven to one superiority in warheads. Let us look at this correlation more closely. First, the President takes as his base figure the figure of 441 Soviet SS-20 missiles (1,323 warheads). But in this instance, the intelligence service has let the President down. Our military people affirm that the Americans have made a mistake and exaggerated the number of Soviet missiles. Second, the President counts all the SS-20 missiles; that is, even those which are located far to the east and cannot reach Western Europe, and therefore, should not be taken into account. Third, the President has completely left out of account the British and French nuclear forces. Lastly, the President has "forgotten" that apart from the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, the United States has considerable forward-based forces in Western Europe which have the capability of hitting targets on the USSR's territory.

So if you count everything that should be counted, the correlation of nuclear charges will be approximately three to two in NATO's favor.

In every specific instance the conscious falsification of data or their distortion as a result of an error requires a well-argued analysis. But it is, perhaps, equally useful to examine the fundamental principles, the conceptual framework used by the United States and the USSR in approaching disarmament problems. After all, ultimately it is these principles and this framework which determine the degree of conscientiousness, the degree of objectivity in the assessment of specific data, and the choice of method of dealing with the figures.

The starting point for the U.S. concept of disarmament may be expressed thus: We have fallen behind the USSR in military-strategic terms. America is weak, almost helpless in the face of the "Soviet threat." Therefore, first we must catch up with the USSR, draw level with it, and only then will we disarm. In other words: Before disarming, it is necessary to upgrade our arms [dovooruzhitsya] substantially. Each new piece of strategic weaponry is regarded in Washington as a "trump card" at talks and an "incentive" which should prompt Moscow to make concessions.

Perhaps I am slightly oversimplifying the U.S. strategists' train of thought, but only in order to expose their logic more clearly: The path to disarmament lies through armament. And that is not just a theoretical conclusion. An extensive program of modernization of strategic offensive forces is being implemented. Work has begun on the "star wars" program -- after all, in order to achieve demilitarization on earth, they assure us, it is necessary first to militarize near-earth space. Incidentally, the U.S. counter proposals submitted to Geneva recently change nothing in this assessment.

The impression created is that the U.S. President is obsessed with his Strategic Defense Initiative. As THE WASHINGTON POST recently put it ironically, he regards this initiative as "practically the second coming of Christ." And the few words which the head of the U.S. Administration did manage to say about disarmament in his UN jubilee speech were devoted to a eulogy of SDI.

Again and again the President insisted that SDI is defense and only defense, that it will provide the opportunity to neutralize the threat which ballistic missiles

pose, and that the world "will sleep more securely when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically." If we, the President said, meaning the United States and the USSR, are "destined to compete militarily... let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both, and much of God's creation along with us."

One would like to say: "Fear God, Mr President!" But let us not give way to emotion. Let us take a closer look at what the White House incumbent asserts.

In effect, any strike system envisaged by the "star wars" program could have a dual function: As a defensive weapon (to shoot down attacking missiles) and as an offensive weapon (to hit targets on land, at sea, in the atmosphere, and in space).

But, SDI's supporters will object, we have no intention of attacking. "The United States," R. Reagan told the Soviet journalists, "has no 'tricks' up its sleeve; we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way." We do not intend to make war at all, we only want to protect ourselves against any unpleasant surprises, just in case.

I will not argue. Let us suppose it is so. But the whole point is that in politics you cannot be oriented exclusively by intentions. Today they may be one thing and tomorrow another. In politics, it is expedient to orient yourself by objective possibilities. If the Americans put strike systems in space, then (regardless of intentions) they will have a real, marked addition to their offensive potential. That is the first thing. The second thing is this: By creating a solid antimissile defense and at the same time, renewing and improving their offensive strategic forces, the Americans (again, regardless of intentions) could obtain the real possibility of making a first strike and covering themselves against a retaliatory strike. People in Washington can think what they like, but people in Moscow cannot help thinking that the implementation of SDI would give the Americans an indisputable military-strategic advantage.

We cannot allow such a turn of events. Therefore, we will be forced to neutralize the U.S. potential with our own. That means a new spiral of the arms race; tens of billions more being spent on military purposes. That means an increase in uncertainty, instability, and impermanence in our already unstable world. If you take a line of "firm, sober realism with open eyes" (I am using the President's words), that is where the White House's senseless stubbornness and its "star wars" program lead.

Now, for the Soviet concept of disarmament. The starting point is the existence of approximate military-strategic parity and relative equality of the nuclear missile forces of the USSR and the United States and of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This parity has a complex structure. Overall equality emerges as the sum of inequalities in specific types of arms and in specific parameters of those arms.

Those who insist that the military-strategic balance is violated in favor of the USSR refer to the fact that the Soviet Union has nearly 300 more strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. That is the case. But, our opponents somehow forget to add that targets are not destroyed by missiles, aircraft, or submarines. Targets are destroyed by charges. And the Americans have far more of those than we do.

In principle, the structure of parity could be made simpler and more stable by equalizing either the number of delivery vehicles (that idea was the basis of the

SALT II treaty) or the number of charges (that is proposed in the recent Soviet proposals). But it is not only a matter of arithmetic and the quantitative side of parity. It also has a qualitative side: parity is maintained while and to the extent that the side subjected to an attack has the guaranteed potential to destroy the aggressor (or in the softer version, to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor).

[10 Nov 85 p 5]

[Second part of two-part article by Aleksandr Bovin under the rubric: "Political Observer's Opinion:" "Two Concepts, Two Approaches"]

[Text] Thus, I repeat, our starting point is the existence of military-strategic parity. And we propose proceeding from it not upward, but downward, and propose immediately, without any delay, without waiting for new "incentives" or "trump cards," to reach an agreement on reducing the level of military confrontation. The main thing in the Soviet proposals is to impose a complete ban on space strike arms and to have the nuclear arms of the USSR and United States capable of reaching each other's territory. Parallel with this, we are ready to conclude an agreement on medium-range nuclear means in Europe.

Of course, it is possible to discuss the specific content of our proposals. We are ready for such discussions. What we propose is not an ultimatum, but a realistic platform for talks, discussions, and a quest for mutually acceptable options. But when we stress our readiness for discussions, what we have in mind are discussions about reducing strategic systems and not discussions about how to build them up "more sensibly." We do not see the task as consisting of ensuring, as the U.S. President proposes, that "equilibrium be achieved between offensive and defensive means," but of ensuring that a new round in the arms race is prevented. We insist that diminution in the level of arms [umensheniye vooruzhennosti] must proceed along broad front, embracing all kinds and types of strategic weapons.

Perhaps only one of our demands can be viewed as an ultimatum: Namely, that military-strategic parity must be maintained at any given moment under any possible scenario of reductions. This is demanded by the security interests of the USSR just as it is, incidentally, by those of the United States.

Realistically, evaluating the situation and the experience of past years it has to be recognized that it is an extremely difficult matter to begin actual, real reduction of strategic potentials and to reach agreement on the scale and pace of such reduction. It is for this reason that we have repeatedly proposed, by way of a first, preliminary step, a freeze on present levels of arms [urovni vooruzhenniy] and a ban on the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. More limited, partial options of a type halting the testing of nuclear weapons or antisatellite systems have also been proposed.

But, what you get from Washington is a monotonous "no." Although, in the United States there are quite a few of supporters of various versions of freezes, even in Congress. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, for example, recommends that the President draft and present the following document to M.S. Gorbachev in Geneva: "The USSR and the United States hereby agree never again to carry out tests of a single ballistic missile."

In arguing his proposal, S. Turner writes: "This accord would probably be the shortest and tersest international protocol in history. It would also effectively bequeath the world the richest possible legacy. If no ballistic missile tests are conducted over a number of years, then neither we nor the Russians will be able to retain certainty in their accuracy in hitting their targets. That would mean we will not know for certain whether we could carry out an accurate surprise strike to put the other side's strategic arsenal out of action. The creation of uncertainty regarding the success of surprise offensive strikes would appreciably [oshchutimo] help reduce the most dangerous tension bound up with nuclear arms and lower the danger of mistakes in crisis situations." The matter is no doubt somewhat more complex than Turner presents it, but the move itself and the thrust of his thinking are important.

Unfortunately, Washington officialdom's thoughts are moving in quite another, opposite direction; they are thinking about how to increase the opportunities for creating [sozdaniye] armaments, rather than about how to reduce and limit those opportunities. The stormy debate about the relationship of the "star wars" program to the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems are indicative in this respect.

The Americans have all along vowed and sworn that they are not exceeding the treaty's framework, insofar as it allows research work. But R. McFarlane stepped forward and declared: As regards space-based ABM systems founded on different physical principles (lasers, elementary particle beams, and others), the treaty allows not only research, but also the creation [sozdaniye] and testing of such systems.

This interpretation of the treaty caused a scandal. The West European allies objected sharply. Obvious dissatisfaction was sensed in Congress. Arguments began within the administration. And the President made a decision which is difficult to liken to Solomon's. It was agreed that McFarlane's broad interpretation of the treaty would be considered legally correct and corresponding to the treaty's spirit and letter. In practical terms, however, [it was agreed] to proceed from the limitations imposed by the old and narrow interpretation when implementing the "star wars" program. In actual fact, even this narrow interpretation runs counter to the treaty. It prohibits the creation [zapreshchayet sozdavat] of a foundation for an ABM system covering the country's entire territory, yet this is precisely what the Americans are doing.

The question arises; Why is it just now, with the summit meeting approaching, that Washington has, so to speak, reserved the right to review at any moment its obligations stemming from the ABM Treaty? By way of an answer I will cite an excerpt from an article by the well-known U.S. observer Don Oberdorfer.

Certain people in the administration, in Oberdorfer's citation of the words by "a certain high-ranking White House staffer," are highly nervous at the thought that Reagan could agree on some SDI limitations in Geneva. And these "certain people" are striving "to cancel this possibility in advance, resorting even now to a new interpretation of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems."

In demonstration of their selfless and noble intentions, the Americans are promising to share with us the secrets of defensive weapons. "...We will make them," R. Reagan told Soviet journalists, "available to other countries, including the Soviet Union." Many thanks, indeed... Actually, as far as I understand it, no one, even in the United States, believes that the prospects held out by the President are for real. And as far as the United States' West European allies are concerned, as London's THE GUARDIAN reported, R. Reagan's promise "was received with a considerable amount of skepticism and interpreted as a propaganda trick and not as the manifestation of a serious approach to the talks." The U.S. President's West European friends are probably close to the truth.

But, let us get back to the freeze. From our point of view, it could create a fundamentally new situation at the talks. Hitherto those who are creating [sozdat] weapons have been working much faster and more efficiently than those conducting talks on disarmament. The result has been that while the latter have argued and have even agreed on something, the former have been outflanking them and presenting them with new and even more complex problems.

Of course, this is not simply a contest between politicians and technicians, or between the diplomats and the military. In any event, the decision to deploy systems that are novel from a military-technical viewpoint is made at the political level. While using the one hand to sign documents curbing the arms race, U.S. politicians have been using the other hand to give their blessing to decisions which practically nullify any limitations that have been agreed. This is what happened when missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles were deployed. This is what is happening now, when cruise missiles are being deployed.

In both cases we repeatedly proposed to the Americans a mutual renunciation of the deployment of new types of weapons. They did not agree. They were too eager to overtake the Soviet Union and regain their former superiority. The results was that similar systems appeared in our country, and U.S. security was not increased, but, on the contrary, was diminished.

And we say: Let us take account of our own experiences, let us learn a lesson from the past, don't let us strive to overtake one another. After all, if a mutual "time out" were to be taken, if the destructive and destabilizing effect that military-technical progress has upon disarmament talks were to be removed, it would probably be possible to reach agreement more rapidly. And again we receive the answer: "No!"

To sum up. The Soviet Union is prepared to come to a halt even tomorrow, to end the arms buildup, and to start a constructive conversation on the radical reduction of strategic potentials under strict verification of this process at all stages. The United States is not prepared for this. It insists that the creation [sozdaniye] of new strategic weapon types marches in parallel with the conversation on arms reductions.

So far, the situation does not inspire hope.

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CSO: 5200/1140

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW URGES U.S. TO DROP 'HOLLOW CHARGES' AGAINST USSR

LD312223 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Viktor Ivanov commentary]

[Text] In the past few days the American administration has hurled more accusations at the Soviet Union, claiming that this country has violated arms limitation agreements and that it has been secretly building up sophisticated weapons. Here now is a commentary by Viktor Ivanov:

The United States administration has again resorted to the ploy that has been frequently used in the past when the United States intended launching another military program. The same arguments were used when the United States decided on the production and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines.

The present propaganda campaign went ahead as the administration increased its efforts to influence Congress and public opinion at home. Charges were made against the Soviet Union as Congress got down to discussing the draft military budget for the fiscal year 1986. The debates are reported to be concentrating on the administration's pet "Star Wars" program and the program of sophisticated chemical weapons. Official claims made by Washington that it is the Soviet Union that is building up antimissile defenses and chemical weapons were therefore quite predictable.

The scale of the present propaganda campaign, however, does draw one's attention. American charges so right across the board. This country is accused of building up every kind of weapon and having violated all agreements and obligations. This betrays Washington's extreme anxiety for the enormous appeal to the world public of the Soviet peace initiatives and their growing popularity, and the growing criticism around the world of Washington's militarist preparations.

It was not for nothing that the Brussels session of the NATO nuclear planning group concentrated on the alleged Soviet violations. The Reagan administration could no longer dismiss the fact that most West Europeans are demanding of their governments that the Soviet proposals for radical reductions in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union be accepted, that the deployment of American nuclear first-strike missiles in Europe be stopped, that the "Star Wars" plan be abandoned, and that chemical weapons be banned.

Washington's propaganda efforts are aimed at diverting the attention of the world public away from Washington's moves, amounting in effect to dismantling such crucial accords and the ABM and SALT II treaties and the treaty banning nuclear tests in three spheres. This may further increase the war threat. All the past charges against the Soviet Union have been shown to be false. Those who made these charges had to acknowledge that, but they did so after they gained their ends. There is every indication that the same will happen again. It should not be forgotten however that every new warhead or missile can take the world over the brink and plunge it into a holocaust. It is high time all these hollow charges were dropped and a businesslike discussion of ways of limiting and reducing weapons opened.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET DOCUMENTARY EXAMINES MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY

LD121841 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 Nov 85

[Documentary entitled "Military-Strategic Parity," produced by the Central Documentary Film Studio and commissioned by the Association of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; presented by IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, with Major General Viktor Mikhaylovich Tatarnikov, representing the Armed Forces General Staff; Vitaliy Zhurkin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace; and Vadim Zagladin, CPSU Central Committee International Department first deputy chief]

[Excerpts] [Bovin] We begin this documentary television movie by asking various people the question: What is military-strategic parity? [Video shows unidentified interviewer interviewing people in a street]

[Unidentified woman] It's equality, isn't it? Equality in the military-strategic sense.

[Interviewer] Tell me, what is military-strategic parity?

[Unidentified girl] Parity? Not priority?

[Interviewer] Parity. Don't you know either?

[Unidentified man] Yes, parity is an approximate balance of forces.

[Movie subtitle "'Parity' -- Dialogue With a Soldier, an Historian, and a Politician;" presented by Aleksandr Bovin, political observer of the newspaper IZVESTIYA"]

[Bovin] We want to tell you what military-strategic parity is. It is one of the fundamental concepts in contemporary political language. We argued for a long time about how we should begin this discussion and in the end, we decided to begin with those brief interviews, which we took simply from people in the street.

You've heard the questions, you've heard the answers, and you probably thought as we did, that not everyone by any means has a sufficiently clear grasp of the most important realities of the nuclear age. Yet, we are living at a time when every person can and should be aware of what surrounds him. It has long been known, they say, that war is too serious a business to be entrusted to soldiers alone, while politics too is such a serious business that it cannot be left to professional politicians alone. Vladimir Ilich Lenin said that politics is where the millions are, but millions means all of you, and me, and we should -- we must -- realise what is going on around us. To do so we

must know the facts, know the arguments, know the basic political problems, and know the language in which these problems are being discussed.

Major General Viktor Mikhaylovich Tatarnikov, representing the General Staff of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces, has kindly consented to answer our questions. General, let's take the bull by the horns, as they say. What is military-strategic parity? What is the balance in armed forces? Answer these questions, please.

[Tatarnikov] The concept of parity, if one looks in the dictionary, means equality, balance, equilibrium. Many factors have to be taken into account here -- the geographical position of states, the components of their strategic forces, the quantity of launchers, the quantity of munitions, and other elements.

[Bovin] Now, if we may, let us turn to strategic forces. When we say strategic weapons, what are they specifically? How can we explain to people what they are?

[Tatarnikov] According to the SALT II treaty definition, strategic weapons are launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles based on land with a range over 5,500 km.

[Bovin] That is, those which can reach the United States from the Soviet Union's territory, for example, and vice versa?

[Tatarnikov] Yes. Further, it includes launchers for ICBM's based on nuclear submarines and on certain types of heavy bombers. Hence, it should be noted that the U.S. medium-range weapons -- that is, the Pershing-2 and land-based cruise missiles, the forward-based weapons, and also the weapons sited at sea which can reach the territory of the Soviet Union -- are a substantial increment to the strategic potential of the United States.

[Bovin] Nevertheless, despite this, there exists a military-strategic parity?

[Tatarnikov] Yes. A parity exists. Its existence, first and foremost in strategic weapons, between the Soviet Union and the United States has been verified [vyverit] many times; that was at the time of the drafting of the SALT II treaty. It was checked right down to every missile, every aircraft, every launcher in general.

[Bovin] That is, in practice we know what they have and they know what we have, otherwise [word indistinct].

[Tatarnikov] [Words indistinct], this has been officially recognized by both sides.

[Bovin] If we now speak about medium-range nuclear weapons, is there an equilibrium here? What are the figures, being specific? Because they are also always saying that we have the advantage.

[Tatarnikov] In medium-range nuclear weapons, it has to be said that of late, NATO has had a certain advantage in launchers and in warheads.

[Bovin] Launchers -- do you consider that to mean missiles and aircraft?

[Tatarnikov] Yes. Here are the figures: For example, the Soviet Union has 850 launchers and about 2,000 warheads. NATO has 990 launchers and more than 3,000 warheads.

[Bovin] Well, in our times even demagogues have to have some kind of proof; how do they show that they are lagging behind us in this case?

[Tatarnikov] It has to be said plainly that they are rich as far as arguments are concerned. They deliberately distort reality. For example, on the NATO side they do not count the British and French medium-range nuclear weapons; they also do not count their carrier-based aircraft. However, for our side they count all medium-range weapons, even those which are sited in the east of the country and which have nothing to do with parity.

[Bovin] Yes. Now, perhaps my last question, General. This parity -- what changes are introduced by what can be called contemporary strategic thinking? What has changed as a result of the fact that such a parity exists? [passage indistinct]

[Tatarnikov] A nuclear war could only be started -- if one intends to come out the victor -- by someone who is determined to commit suicide. Hence, the whole irrationality of the arms race. No efforts by any party to dash ahead, to upset the balance of forces, will arrive at results. The other side will simply not permit this. Unfortunately, in Washington they still think in the categories of the pre-nuclear age. They want to bring back the days when they could rely on their superiority, on their strength. But those days can't be brought back.

[Bovin] Thank you very much, Viktor Mikhaylovich. And now we will try to return to other times.

[Video caption: "Dialogue With a Historian"]

[Bovin] Our guide [words indistinct] times will be Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Vitaly Vladimirovich, tell us, please, how does this problem of military-strategic parity appear from the historical point of view?

[Zhurkin] It all started from the viewpoint that there was no parity if one talks in terms of a correlation of forces. There was an imbalance -- the United States held the monopoly, a nuclear monopoly.

The Americans were the first to test an atomic bomb when they destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to the smallest calculations over 270,000 people were killed, but the exact figure will probably never be known. Perhaps it...

[Bovin interrupts] From the military point of view it was unjustified?

[Zhurkin] Absolutely unjustified. It was a purely political act, a political act directed against the Soviet Union. The leaders in the United States at that time, as it were, were saying to the Soviet Union: You must understand who is the strongest in the world today, you must understand who has the right to lead it.

[Bovin] I have the impression that we appeared to be slow-witted at that time.

[Zhurkin] The nuclear blackmail did not work. Then, the Cold War started against us, economic pressure, political pressure. But, at the same time, preparations for a hot war were also going on.

[Bovin] What is interesting is that the Americans [words indistinct] were saying: We had the bomb, you didn't. We could have brought you to your knees, but we didn't. And this means, proves, that the United States is a peace-loving country. We have never had any aggressive intentions, have none, and will not have any. That was their psychology, that was their reasoning on the problem.

[Zhurkin] Firstly, what a surplus of a love of peace there was on America's part! But if one comes to the point, it was probably difficult -- even impossible -- to retune psychologically a country which had just come out of World War II into a new world war.

[Bovin] Against its own ally?

[Zhurkin] First, against its own ally, and second, against a country which was the decisive force in the rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism. At that time nuclear bombs comprised merely a part of the balance -- a substantial one, but still just a part. The Americans at first did not have very many bombs, nor many means of delivery. So, on the whole, the balance was indeterminate. But finally, while the United States was building up this balance and psychologically preparing its people for a future war, the Soviet Union did the very thing they did not anticipate.

[Bovin] What was that?

[Zhurkin] They expected it would happen within 10, perhaps 15 years, but in August 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb; in August 1953, its first hydrogen bomb; on 4 October 1957, the first Soviet sputnik was launched; and, incidentally, a month and a half before that, in August 1957, the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile was tested. So if the invulnerability of the United States had not been ended at that time, the future would have been clearly predicted.

[Bovin] That's interesting. Does that mean from what you say that, let's say since 1957, military-strategic parity has been established?

[Zhurkin] Well, of course, the answer is no. The United States, then, as now, led the arms race, just as in the past they were the instigators of this race. Naturally, they built up more -- there were more bombs, more means of delivery in the United States -- but gradually, and it must be said, rapidly, the Soviet Union caught them up, eventually, sometime at the end of the sixties or the start of the seventies, caught them up and achieved strategic parity.

[Bovin] As far as I understand, SALT I was signed in Moscow in 1972 and so, the sides proceeded from precisely the [word indistinct] military-strategic parity. Wasn't that the case?

[Zhurkin] Undoubtedly.

[Bovin] We have here a sort of political, a psychological nuance. The Americans have, generally speaking, actually agreed with the fact that they are no longer number one; that there has indeed existed an approximate parity since 1982.

[Zhurkin] In words, the Americans did proceed from this, and on paper, too. In actual fact, though, all U.S. policy in the military-political field has since then and up until today been essentially an attempt to break out of the vice of that parity.

[Bovin] This supposition and this hypothesis were made up, so to speak, into some kind of argument.

[Zhurkin] Let's take a brief look at the main stages of the arms race over the course of these 15 years. As you recall, the first missiles were multistage: One missile had one warhead and knocked out one target. By the start of the seventies the Americans, at first, created missiles with separable warheads and with an individual targetable element. This meant that a missile with 10 warheads could knock out 10 targets.

[Bovin] Of course, this at once complicates the problem of verification, and the number of charges has, at the same time, increased considerably.

[Zhurkin] Considerably. In the seventies and up to 1980 the number of charges on the U.S. side increased from 5,000 to 10,000 -- they doubled. The Soviet Union, when the SALT I talks began, persistently demanded that these missiles be banned. But, in the United States they were already in preparation, and the Americans refused. What happened? The Americans unwrapped them at the start of the seventies...

[Bovin interrupts] The Americans wanted to outdo us, but 5 years later, by the mid-seventies, the Soviet Union also started unwrapping them since we could not allow the Americans to break the parity.

Now, for an example from the SALT II period. While the SALT II talks were in progress, long-range cruise missiles were appearing on the U.S. horizon. These were a new, fourth type of strategic weapon. The Soviet Union demanded -- incidentally, we are continuing to demand even now -- that this latest channel of the arms race be shut. The Americans refused and began to deploy these cruise missiles; in response they got the same back.

Now we have Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which is more correctly called the "star wars" program. This is also a case of calculating on breaking the parity and achieving military-strategic superiority.

[Bovin] As I understand it, the problem of space and "star wars" is no longer history -- it is the most urgent and burning problem. Thank you Vitaliy Vladimirovich for such a very useful explanation. We will hope that space will also become history. But for the moment, future history has not happened and we will now turn to our third interlocutor who will present us, comrades, with topical, present-day aspects of our theme.

[Video caption: "Dialogue With a Politician"]

We are talking to Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. Vadim Valentinovich, if we are speaking of military-strategic parity, what is the situation today, at the moment?

[Zagladin] The main thing today is that this parity has been maintained and not violated, and will not be violated.

[Bovin] To be more specific, the Americans are trying to violate it. What are these attempts to violate parity?

[Zagladin] Very simply, to use the language of statistics. We are talking about how new kinds of strategic weapons are now being made ready or brought into use; first and foremost, two new bombers, the B1-B and Stealth. [passage indistinct] Then, there are two new missiles, Midgetman and MX; Trident-2, the new missiles for submarines; and then, various kinds and a large number of cruise missiles.

Approximately, if we are to take the statistics, so to speak -- I'll just get them. To take the factual statistics, then they (?look) approximately like this: As the Americans themselves report, they have at present 11,286 nuclear warheads, but by other figures this is up to 12 [as heard]; by 1990 it is planned to have 20,000 nuclear warheads of a strategic nature. These are the attempts to violate parity.

The main thing here, of course, is not the equipment -- the equipment is important in itself -- but the political decision that was made and which speaks very clearly of the fact that the Soviet Union must be pursued...

[Bovin interrupts] The course toward supremacy.

[Zagladin] Yes, Weinberger admitted this, saying that supremacy is the most important thing; that remains at the base of this.

[Bovin] And now there is a great deal of talk about "star wars," (?about the work of strategic)...

[Zagladin interrupts] And (?they are signing up for this course).

[Bovin] How are they (?signing up).

[Zagladin] The fact is that we are, in essence, talking about very simple things. So, at one time they tried to leave us behind in the field of strategic weapons. But this did not succeed; parity was established and it is holding. Now, a new attempt has been made, an attempt to leave us behind in this course toward supremacy using the scientific and technological revolution, new technology. They think we lag behind in this. And so, the "star wars" idea appeared. Moreover, in essence the space weapons we are talking about do not concern just defense, as they say. These are weapons which, according to information from the Americans themselves, can firstly, hit any target on earth; that is, not just missiles flying toward the United States, but any target. Secondly, they can hit any target; the press has already written that they can burn areas sown to crops and so on. Thirdly, and this is most important, it is envisaged as a weapon acting in conjunction with strategic offensive weapons.

[Bovin] As a first-strike escort, in effect.

[Zagladin] In effect, yes. Moreover, it was an interesting moment when President Reagan made his famous speech about space on 23 March 1983.

He said an antimissile defense system in space -- if in conjunction with offensive systems -- could be evaluated as a factor promoting an aggressive policy.

[Bovin] (?And that is possible)?

[Zagladin] That is possible. And then came the interpretations. Specifically, the US Congress' department for appraising equipment then said that the aim of strategic defense is to ensure a sufficiently powerful defense, thanks to which the United States could present a serious threat of using thermonuclear weapons should it make such a decision.

[Bovin] [Passage indistinct] What, so to speak, is the situation?

[Zagladin] This is a political decision. It is not possible to say beforehand with precision; it is difficult to determine the future precisely. There will be various options. One option is that we come to an agreement with the United States; that means we come to an agreement on excluding the militarization of space and embark on the road toward a considerable reduction in the level of strategic and other weapons while keeping parity at each given (?stage).

[Bovin] And the second option?

[Zagladin] The second option is that we do not come to agreement. And, if we do not come to agreement, it will be all the worse. Then there will be a new spiral in the arms race, much more dangerous and much more complex. Naturally, this will provoke the militarization of space and then, naturally, a further buildup and improvement in strategic weapons. Our course toward strengthening peace, toward preserving peace, remains unchanged, but of course...

[Bovin interrupts] We will also have to buildup weapons.

[Zagladin] Yes, yes. There can be no doubt that the appropriate response will be found and, of course, it will be 100 percent of that which the Americans present us with. We will find our own options, but we will have to spend money which we would with pleasure spend on other purposes; that is indisputable.

[Bovin] And then what? War? (?After all, this cannot go on endlessly).

[Zagladin] Yes. One cannot dismiss this option, but, of course, our choice would be different. Our choice is still to return to a sensible policy, to a sensible dialogue with the United States, to resolving issues. What is important now -- speaking from the political point of view -- is that it is not only up to the United States.

First, the struggle is under way in the United States itself, but the main thing is that there are other forces in the world, the socialist countries, the nonaligned states, almost all of them with immense masses of people brought actively into action. And, of course, parity itself works in this direction because both in the United States and in Western Europe responsible figures understand that pressing the button means bringing down on oneself all the might of nuclear weapons from the other side. So, in the final analysis, reason should [word indistinct].

[Bovin] I am pleased you are an optimist. Thank you very much Vadim Valentinovich for your comment.

[Video shows tape being loaded into VCR, then film of a woman trying to break a bottle of champagne on the bow of a submarine to launch it.

[The bottle does not break, but the submarine, draped with a U.S. flag, is shown moving down the slipway]

[Bovin] Perhaps this scene is also from the realms of optimism, a special sign, so to speak. The Americans launch their latest nuclear submarine. A bottle of champagne was to be broken over it, but this did not succeed. However, as you can see, the optimistic woman did not give in.

If we emerge from this political through-the-looking glass [zazerklye], the more vessels there are, the less change there is for optimism. And so, in preserving military-strategic parity -- and undermining attempts by the United States to violate it -- we have done and will do everything possible to begin a real movement toward a world without weapons, toward a world without wars.

People say this is utopia, but on the other hand, experience shows that history is participating in the process of realizing utopia, and this, comrades, inspires hope. It is people that inspire hope, the increasing number of people who are saying "no" to war. They do not want to be passive targets for someone else's wars. These people believe in their potential, they believe that sooner or later reason will triumph. All of this has also been called the moral factor. The mass antiwar movement is now not just a moral factor; they can lean for support on the strength and peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, on the peace-loving policy of dozens of nonaligned states, and this, I repeat, inspires hope.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: INCREASED U.S. MILITARY BUDGET FUELS ARMS RACE

PM041252 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 85 First Edition p 5

[Nikolay Kurdyumov "Commentator's Column": "On the Altar of Militarism"]

[Text] Imperialism's greatest crime before the peoples is the race for nuclear and other arms which it has unleashed on an unprecedented scale. The U.S. ruling circles' aggressive course in the postwar period is visible confirmation of the validity of this conclusion contained in the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program. Extreme right-wing U.S. political circles associated with the military-industrial complex are the most zealous champions of the escalation of the arms race and of the truly total U.S. military preparations with a view to achieving military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. A giant increase in the military budget has been taking place in recent years under the pressure from them. Thus, whereas in 1981 the "ceiling" for appropriations to the Pentagon stood at \$171.5 billion, they now exceed the \$300 billion mark. Following the Senate, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress recently rubber-stamped the final version of a bill on military spending for fiscal 1986, which provides for a further increase in military appropriations and the swelling of the Pentagon budget to the unprecedented level of \$302.5 billion.

As in previous years, preference in spending these colossal sums will be given to the accelerated buildup of the nuclear arsenal of first-strike means, including MX ICBM's, and to the development of the new Midgetman strategic missile. Vast amounts have been planned to continue work on the "star wars" program and to produce a new generation of chemical weapons, -- neuroparalytic binary ammunition and so forth. In other words, at the same time as the Soviet Union is advancing large-scale proposals which open up the way to the radical reduction of nuclear arsenals, Washington is cranking the fly-wheel of war preparations with redoubled energy.

In this connection, the question arises: How can all this be reconciled with the U.S. Administration's declarations of its desire to substantially reduce strategic nuclear arms? It is not hard, therefore, to understand the doubts as to the seriousness of the U.S. approach to the question of arms control which many world press organs have been voicing in recent days when commenting on official Washington's attempts to alter the accents in preparations for the Geneva meeting and to avoid resolving the problems of disarmament.

It is quite obvious that such improper efforts by the U.S. side can only poison the atmosphere of preparations for the Geneva summit meeting, on which the peoples pin great hopes of strengthening peace and security for all mankind.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR REPORTS UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT

USSR Delegate Address Reported

PM241541 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 85 First Edition p 9

[Own correspondent A. Tolkunov report under the general heading "For Universal Security"]

[Text] New York, 23 October--the leitmotiv of the general discussion in the First Political Committee at the 40th UN General Assembly session is the idea of the need to step up and pool the efforts of all states with a view to ensuring international security and curbing the arms race.

"Disarmament," the Brazilian representative states, "accords with everyone's interests, and is also a matter of everyone's collective responsibility." The need to take concrete, practical steps in this direction was noted in the speeches of delegations from Austria, Poland, the CSSR, Greece, Sri Lanka, and other states.

USSR representative V.F. Petrovskiy pointed to the priority nature of the task of preventing the spread of the arms race to space and noted that its immediate resolution would help to strengthen existing accords and achieve new ones on the limitation and subsequent reduction of nuclear arms up to their complete elimination.

It was noted that the Soviet Union attaches great significance, in the struggle against the nuclear threat, to strengthening in every way the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR supports the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe. We believe that nonnuclear states which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory have the full right to reliable international legal guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

As a result of U.S. actions, the danger of chemical weapons spreading across the planet has intensified. The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in the elaboration of an international accord on their nonproliferation. The creation of zones free from chemical weapons is promising in this regard.

The Soviet representative's speech also drew attention to Soviet proposals associated with the limitation of conventional arms and reaffirmed the USSR's readiness to hold talks on limiting the sale and delivery of conventional arms.

In the course of the debate many delegates supported such Soviet proposals as the prevention of an arms race in space, the ending of nuclear weapon tests, a nuclear weapon freeze, and others.

Debate Ends

LD261024 Moscow TASS in English 0735 GMT 26 Oct 85

[Text] New York October 26 TASS--TASS correspondent Vyachaslav Chernyshev reports:

The First Committee of the UN General Assembly has wound up the general debate on all issues on the agenda concerning disarmament. The discussions centered on the package of the major Soviet initiatives pertaining to putting an end to the nuclear weapons race, to a sharp cut in their level and preventing arms race in outer space.

As representatives of different states--socialist, non-aligned and even a number of Western states have pointed out, of particularly great significance has been the draft resolution tabled by the Soviet Union at the First Committee on international cooperation in peaceful exploration of outer space in conditions of its non-militarization. The Soviet proposal on a mutual 50 percent cut in nuclear weapons reaching the territory of the USSR and the United States, the moratorium on all nuclear blasts unilaterally introduced by the Soviet Union have met with broad support from the international community.

At the same time, practically all delegates who addressed the debate, with the exception of a handful of the closest allies of the United States in NATO, have strongly criticized the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) of the White House. As Ethiopia's representative Kassa Kebede stressed, the implementation of that programme, which has nothing to do with defence aims will draw the world even closer to a nuclear catastrophe.

The keynote of the general debate has been the idea of the need to pool the efforts of all states for ensuring immediate and considerable progress in the disarmament effort and strengthening strategic stability. A discordant note has been struck by U.S. representative G. Okun, who was trying to justify Washington's stubborn intention to implement the "star wars" programme, attempted to convince the delegates that the well-founded apprehension caused by the programme was "nothing more than a hyperbole." He has again reaffirmed the refusal of the United States to agree to an end to nuclear weapons tests.

TASS Notes GDR Draft Resolution

LD012244 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] New York, 31 October TASS--The call to the Geneva disarmament conference to embark immediately on talks on ending the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in space and on complete and effective banning of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and its destruction is contained in a draft resolution submitted by the GDR for the consideration of the first committee (political and security including disarmament) of the UN General Assembly. The need for this is motivated by the stepping up of the arms race and the plans to transfer it to outer space, the document says.

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER EDITORIAL ON WARSAW PACT UNITY

PM060952 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 85 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "For the Sake of Peace and the People's Security"]

[Excerpts]

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution was a crucial event in world history. It marked, 68 years ago, the beginning of an irresistible process -- capitalism's replacement by the new communist sociopolitical formation. The victorious revolution's first legislative act -- Lenin's Decree on Peace -- proclaimed the struggle for a democratic world and international cooperation as the supreme principle of the socialist state's foreign policy. History since the October Revolution convincingly shows that socialism was and remains the staunchest defender of sound principles in international relations, the firmest bastion of peace, and its most reliable guard.

A world without wars or weapons -- that is socialism's ideal. This thought is emphasized in the draft new edition of the CPSU Program. Socialism is a society whose thoughts and actions in the international arena are aimed toward upholding the people's desire for independence and social progress and subordinated to the main task of preserving and consolidating peace.

The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was socialism's historic achievement. It consolidated the positions of the USSR, the socialist countries, and all progressive forces and frustrated the aggressive imperialist circles' calculations of victory in a world nuclear war. The maintenance of that equilibrium is a major guarantee of ensuring peace and international security.

The urgent tasks of the struggle for peace, eliminating the nuclear threat, improving the situation in Europe and throughout the world, preventing the militarization of space and ending the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, the struggle for disarmament and for restoring international relations to the course of detente and equitable, mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence was at the center of attention of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Conference in Sofia.

The supreme representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR also held a fruitful exchange of opinions on topical questions of cooperation among the Warsaw Pact states.

The Warsaw Pact states' statement "For the Elimination of the Nuclear Threat and Change for the Better in European and World Affairs," unanimously adopted at the conference, notes that international tension has increased sharply in recent years. The world has come close to the point beyond which events could get out of control. The reasons for the increase in tension and the military danger are found in the policy of imperialism, primarily U.S. imperialism, which makes no secret of the fact that it is pursuing the goal of military superiority in order to dictate its will to other peoples and states. In a tense and sometimes explosive situation in Europe and the world the socialist states' leaders indicated realistic paths for reducing the military threat and restoring international relations to the course of detente. By supporting unanimously the Soviet Union's major new initiatives in the disarmament sphere, they confirmed the common stances of the fraternal parties and countries on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva.

It was firmly stated in Sofia that the Warsaw Pact states will not relinquish their peoples' security under any circumstances. They do not strive for military superiority, but neither will they allow military superiority to be gained over them. They resolutely oppose the arms race and its escalation and urge that the balance of forces be ensured at the lowest level.

The Sofia conference's most important outcome, as a regular CPSU Central Committee Politburo session stressed, is the further strengthening of the allied socialist states' unity and cohesion, the improvement of their cooperation mechanism within the Warsaw Pact framework, and the fraternal countries' steadfast determination to continue waging a persistent struggle for our planet's peaceful future.

The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aimed at strengthening peace and the peoples' security enjoys the boundless support of working people and our Armed Forces' servicemen. Given the complex international situation and the arms race unleashed by the United States and the other NATO countries, Army and Navy personnel see it as their duty to persistently improve their combat and political training and vigilantly and reliably protect peace and socialism.

To prevent nuclear catastrophe and ensure the peoples' supreme right -- the right to a peaceful life and to independent and free development -- that is how the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries see their main task today. That is why all people of goodwill respond fervently to the words of the CPSU Central Committee's October slogan:

LONG LIVE THE SOVIET UNION'S LENINIST FOREIGN POLICY -- A POLICY OF CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND THE PEOPLES' SECURITY AND OF BROAD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. [Preceding passage printed in uppercase.]

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR FIRST-USE BAN PROPOSED--New York, 2 November TASS--The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is one of the most important and urgent measures to be taken to prevent nuclear war, says a draft resolution submitted to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly by Hungary and the GDR. The draft notes a broad and positive international response to the no-first-use concept and suggests that the United Nations call upon all the nuclear-armed powers to adopt appropriate commitments. It is proposed that the disarmament conference examine the question of drafting an international legal document which would formulate the commitment on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons. [Text]
[Moscow TASS in English 0811 GMT 2 Nov 85 LD] /12232

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